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Abstract
Looking to understand what drives countriesexport growth
in practice, I provide a decomposition of world export growth at
the product variety level between new destinations, new prod-
ucts, and growth in value of old varieties. New destinations play
a signicant role, accounting for 37 percent of the growth in
developing countries. By comparison, entry into new product
categories a margin that has received considerable attention
explains just 7 percent of export growth. Exploring tha na-
ture of destination expansion reveals it is neither automatic nor
permanent. Even relatively competitive sectors face di¢ culties
penetrating new destinations, and these di¢ culties are negatively
correlated with population size and GDP per capita. Consistent
with pervasive experimentation and failure, more than a third of
all products in new destinations exported only once to a destina-
tion in the sixteen years studied.
JEL codes: F14, F15, F19
Key words: International trade, export growth, destinations,
export growth decomposition.
1 Introduction
This paper explores simple but empirically important question: what
explains world export growth? In particular, how relevant are new des-
tinations, new products, and growth in value? And, do successful ex-
porters exhibit a di¤erent pattern of growth within these dimensions
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than those that struggle? Rather than focusing on the theory or causal
mechanisms behind export growth, I attack these questions from a mea-
surement perspective. This approach reveals a number of stylized facts
that emphasize the role of destination discovery over product discovery
and the crucial but di¢ cult journey of geographic exploration. Given
the increasing importance of export ledgrowth as an applied concept,
particularly in developing economies, understanding what drives exports
shines light on the potential payo¤s and pitfalls of engaging in di¤erent
strategies for export growth.
Both the empirical and policy-oriented trade literature devotes con-
siderable attention to export determinants such as the patterns and im-
pact of structural transformation, the role R&D and technology adop-
tion, and the capacity to sustain comparative advantages vs. expand
productive capabilities. With this focus on obvious forms of innovation,
market penetration has usually been relegated to part of exporting more
of the same an area of less active research. Recent microlevel data
and the surge in theoretical research that tries to explain it has changed
this situation somewhat by highlighting that market penetration is not
automatic. Together with gravity there seem to be important xed and
sunk costs of exporting and, in particular, of exporting to specic des-
tinations. These costs inhibit rms product expansion into foreign
markets. But how important, really, is the destinations dimension?
This paper decomposes export growth along the dimensions of (a)
products number, (b) destination diversity, and (c) product value (or
quality). Analyzing exports in this way is not only methodologically
interesting but conceptually enlightening. The type of innovations re-
quired for rms to increase value, say, are distinct from the ones required
to produce new products or the ones required to enter a given geographic
market. Selling co¤ee in a new market is di¤erent from making co¤ee
for the rst time or improving an existing brand. Moreover, the policies
required to solve potential market or coordination failures in these three
dimensions are also di¤erent compare, for example, R&D incentives
with export promotion agencies and free trade agreements. The mul-
tidemensional reality of innovation that drives export growth is widely
recognized and studied. This paper extends earlier e¤orts by focusing on
a less explored empirical dimension the importance of new destinations
for specic products.
To do this analysis, I rst present a simple decomposition framework
that separates new destinations, new products, and the growth of the
value in the initial variety structure of exports. This framework is then
used to decompose export growth for each country for the period 1984-
2000 into the contribution of initial 1984 varieties (the value of products
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that were exported in specic destinations in 1984 and which are still
being exported in 2000 to those destinations), the contribution of new
products (the value of products that were not exported in 1984 and
were exported in 2000 to any country), and the contribution of new
destinations (the value of products that were exported in 1984 but in
destinations which were not served in that year).
Using Feenstra et als (2005) robust world bilateral trade database,
I nd that for the period 1984-2000 the main source of export growth
is the growth in the value of exported varieties that were already ex-
ported in 1984. For developing countries as a whole, value growth
within existing products and destinations accounts for 55 percent of
overall export growth. New destinations are the second most impor-
tant dimension, accounting for an additional 37 percent, which is highly
signicant. New products a dimension that has received tremendous
empirical attention accounts for only 7 percent of growth, which is sur-
prisingly small. The basic stylized fact that emerges is clear: entering
new countries is crucial to export growth.
Looking closer at the data, I nd that countries whose exports grow
fastest tend to grow faster in every export component than countries
whose exports grow slower, but di¤erentially faster in new destinations,
particularly when compared to the slowest growers. Digging deeper into
the destination margin exposes two additional stylized facts: First, even
relatively competitive sectors of each country face di¢ culties penetrating
new destinations, and these di¢ culties are negatively correlated with
population size and GDP per capita. Second, more than a third of all
new varieties introduced by any country are one-shot exports (products
that are exported only once to a destination and never again in the period
studied). This result suggests that experimentation and failure may be
a pervasive phenomenon in the decision to export to a new destination.
While not easily explained by recent trade theories, cost uncertainty in
new destinations may play an important role. Together, these ndings
highlight again that importance of understanding destination decisions.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes
the current state of relevant theoretical research related export decom-
position techniques. Section 3 explains the decomposition methodology
used in this paper. Section 4 describes the database used and provides
some preliminary descriptive statistics. Section 5 details the main results
of the paper. Section 6 provides additional insights on the relevance of
new destinations. Finally, section 7 concludes and provides several po-
tential lines of further research.
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2 Literature Review
2.1 Trade Theory
Destinations have recently become a prominant issue since new mi-
crolevel data that showed that only a small percentage of rms export
(and only the most productive ex-ante do1), that they export in every
economic sector (in developed economies) and that they export typically
to very few places. These issues, which were not able to be explained by
newtrade theories, motivated a prolic recent wave of new theories of
trade at the rm level, which have increasingly specic predictions with
respect to destinations.
Previously almost no trade theories had anything to say about the rel-
evance or the structure of trade with respect to destinations. The models
that dealt with bilateral trade were gravity models, which were accurate
in explaining the level of trade between countries but not complex pat-
terns of growth. These models, and the traditional or new trade theory
models that produced them, typically could not predict why countries
do not trade many of their products with other countries or why they
do not trade at all. They implicitly or explicitly implied that countries
would trade all products to all the world (i.e.: new trade theories with
love for variety) or that they would specialize in the products in which
they have a comparative advantage and the extent of trade with other
countries would depend on the di¤erence in relative factor endowments
(traditional Heckscher-Ohlin theory).
With the shift towards the rm, modeling of xed costs of exporting,
together with rm heterogeneity, new theories have been able to pre-
dict why some rms do not export, and why others export only to some
countries. If we aggregate this within product categories or at the coun-
try level these microeconomic barriers help explain why countries export
some products and only to some countries. Exporting a specic product
to a countries that is farther away and smaller is typically less protable.
In the limit, this increases the likelihood that the xed/sunk costs tirms
have to pay to enter are high enough so as to make it unprotable to
export in a given market. Only the most productive rms will have
a higher chance of reaching more di¢ cultmarkets2. These costs are
1Bernard and Jensen (1999) and Clerides, Lach and Tybout (1998) found that
exporters self select being the most productive ex ante, and not due to exporting,
and provided a base for the theories of rm heterogeneity, explained in the following
lines.
2These costs seem to be high enough to generate hysteresis e¤ects associated with
the decision of majority of rms not to export. See for example Roberts and Tybout
(1997), Also Das Roberts and Tybout (2006) estimate these costs to be more than
$300,000 for Colombian rms.
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therefore modelled as rm specic, in some papers. In others, if there
are sunk costs specic to individual destinations, and if destinations vary
in terms of their protability, relatively more productive producers will
export to more destinations. If there are sunk costs specic to individual
products, and if products vary in terms of their protability for a rm,
relatively more productive exporters will also export a wider range of
products (Bernard et al 2007).
Besides this general prediction, the most known models have di¤er-
ent assumptions and features that yield particular explicit and implicit
implications for destinations. In general the extent of the importance
of new market penetration is not predicted explicitly by any theory.
Rather, what some of the recent theories do provide is basic predictions
on the order of country penetration and on the relation between size
and number of products exported and countries served. Within this
new strand of research a few papers are worth summarizing briey.
Melitz (2003) builds a general equilibriummodel based on monopolis-
tic competition and increasing returns, productivity heterogeneity, sunk
costs of entry, and where the main source of uncertainty is in the produc-
tivity a rm will have prior to entry into an industry. He assumes sunk
and variable costs of exporting, but the rms decide to export knowing
their productivity and the xed cost they have to incur. This means
that exporting is not an uncertain activity. Only rms that draw the
productivity above a threshold will nd it protable to export.
As Eaton et al (2005) indicate, the major cost of exporting in this
model is getting out of the home market, since xed costs are not des-
tination specic. There are no specic predictions in the model about
the importance of destinations. In the simplest setting of the original
model, since all countries are of equal size rms do not export or export
to all markets, so there is broad penetration of markets once you export.
Bigger countries of have the same distribution of productivity, but a
higher average productivity levels, higher relative number of rms, and
a higher welfare due to more varieties. Dynamics are centered on real-
location of production between rms and the e¤ect in the amount rms
export, not the countries to where they do3. Like most recent models
that seek to explain the cross-sectional patterns of product diversity and
market entry, this paper therefore does not explain dimensions of export
growth the primary issue studied in this paper.
3In extensions, such as Melitz and Ottaviano (2005), where they introduce endoge-
nous markups bigger economies have more high productivity rms, which together
with variable export costs besides xed costs makes the penetration of markets dif-
ferential for the higher productivity rms being able to reach smaller markets.
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Bernard et al (2003) use a multicountry Ricardian model with sto-
chastic rm heterogeneity. They do not introduce xed costs of exporting
but the standard iceberg costs, which together with international com-
petition for similar varieties result in some countries exporting certain
goods to certain (or all) countries. A rm will export only when its cost
advantage over its competitors around the world overcomes geographic
barriers.One of the main implications of the model is that as a source
country becomes more competitive in a given market (greater average
e¢ ciency, lower input costs or lower costs of delivery), it will export a
wider range of goods to that market.
Eaton Kortum and Kramarz (2004, 2005) build a model with xed
costs of entering an individual market and variable costs of exporting.
That is, costs have a destination country component that applies to all
goods exported to that country and a component specic to the good.
There is no component specic to the exporting country.
Their model predicts that there should be a ranking of export desti-
nations. A rm should rst sell to the most popular market in a given
year, then to the second, etc. The most e¢ cient rms are able to pro-
duce and export to lower popular destinations, but to be able to do this
they must sell more in popular markets in order to lower costs (however,
this prediction is not sustained by the data).
This is the only model that I studied that has a specic prediction of
the number of countries to be served for a rm: if a rm sell to a market
n it must sell to all markets more popular than n and in increasing
quantities. Put another way, the model has a specic production of the
sales in any given market by knowing how much is sold in less popular
markets.
Calibrating the model with French data they nd a clear relationship
between the size of rms sales in France and the number of markets
served. It seems that to sell to unpopular markets rms must be big in
their own country.
Helpman, Melitz, Rubinstein (2006) provide one of the most recent
extensions to Melitz model to incorporate destination specic xed, vari-
able costs and generate a gravity equation. These costs are source and
destination-country specic rather than rm specic, and do not depend
on the productivity level of the producer as in previous models. .
Moreover, their empirical framework includes xed trade barriers im-
posed by the importing country to all exporters and xed export costs
common across all destinations.
The power of their model is that it allows to predict from the model
zero bilateral trade, one way and two-way bilateral trade.
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2.2 Export Decomposition Literature
The second relevant literature for this paper is the export decomposition
literature. Export decompositions have been carried out along several
dimensions and using various techniques. While the basic idea is old,
decompositions that take into account destinations are relatively recent.
This paper builds on some of these exercises.
Two decompositions for export levels are worth mentioning. First,
Hummels and Klenow (2005) examine why bigger economies export more
than small ones. In doing so, they decompose exports into the number
of goods exported (extensive margin) and the value per good (inten-
sive margin). Using cross section trade data for 126 countries they nd
that the extensive margin accounts for 60% of greater exports of larger
economies.
Second, Bernard, Jensen, Redding and Schott (2007) touch on des-
tinations and analyze the product-destination margin, but at the rm
level and for a single year. They decompose exports per country in the
number of rms that export to that country, the number of products ex-
ported and value per rm/product, testing the e¤ect of distance through
rm participation. They nd a signicant e¤ect of distance and GDP
on the three, but a positive impact (distance) on the value exported per
rm and product. They also nd that rms that export many products
also export to many destinations and account for the bulk of US ex-
ports. Also, the rms decision of the number of markets to serve (and
products) is systematically correlated with its characteristics 4.
Additionally, four papers from recent literature decompose particu-
larly export growth.
Evenett and Venables (2002) decompose export growth from a small
set of developing economies between 1970 and 1997, using 3 digit trade
data. Using a similar methodology to this paper, they analyze products
and destinations separately and seek to understand the reduction in
the number of zeros in trade matrices. They nd that new products
account for 10 percent of export growth, while new destinations close to
30 percent. The remaining 60 percent of export growth can be attributed
to products exported to destinations in 1970 which were still exported
in 19975.
4These two papers provide methodologies that are not strictly comparable to the
one used in this paper, mainly because their decompositions compares export levels
between countries and this paper analyzes export growth within countries. Thus the
extensive and intensive margins have di¤erent meanings. In the case of Hummels
and Klenow to compare bigger exports of bigger countreis with smaller countries the
extensive margin is dened as more products as compared to new products used in
this paper.
5Their paper also uses gravity and dummies for distance between a market and
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Eaton, Eslava, Kuegler and Tybout (2007) do a dynamic analysis of
Colombian export growth between 1996 and 2005, decomposing it by
entering, exiting and continuing rms in a year-to-year decomposition.
They nd that continuing rms drive most of year-to-year uctuations.
But taking a larger time frame (1996-2005) they nd that continuing
rm structure represents only 53 percent of growth (decomposed in 74
percent of surviving rms and -21 percent of dead rms), while new rms
account for 47 percent of export growth6. They also nd that in any year
around 67 percent of new exporters last only one year exporting.
Helpman, Melitz and Rubinstein (2006) seeking also to explain and
understand two-way or one-way zero trade, decompose export growth
between exports from countries that already traded in 1970 in both
directions and those who did not, nding that more than 90 percent of
the growth of exports comes from trade relations that were two-way in
19707. They show that the volume of trade of countries that traded with
one another was signicantly determined by the percentage of rms that
engaged in international trade, more than from the value exported per
rm. They conclude that the classical gravity estimations bias upwards
the importance of distance on trade ows because it attributes to the
volume of trade e¤ects that a¤ect the number of rms exporting.
Broda and Weinstein (2006) analyze the increase in product variety
in US imports in the last 30 years, looking at the relevance of new
categories and deadcategories between 1990 and 2001. Their analysis
is focused on the number of varieties imported by the US, nding that
almost half of the increase in the number of varieties seems to be due to
an increase in the number of goods imported and the other half coming
from more countries exporting to the US. The explanation for this last
issue, according to the authors, is globalization plus value of variety.
They also nd that the countries that export more varieties are typical
larger high income economies.
The methodology of decomposition of this paper is based on the
Eaton et al (2007) decomposition which, as them, analyzes contribu-
its closest serving market to search for geographical spillovers in the probability of
exporting a product.
6Their treatment of dead rms is di¤erent from this paper. Since they use rms as
unit of analysis they include deaths in the extensive margin, substracting them from
entering rms to get a net entry of rms. In this paper I substract dead varieties
to continuing varieties to get the net growth of the original variety structure. See
section 3 for details.
7Since their paper also analyzes export growth, compare their results with Even-
net and Venables (2002), nding important di¤erences. They conjecture that their
sample is not representative and that what they name new destinationsare in many
cases countries that traded with each other before possibly in other products.
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tions to export growth between two point in time. In contrast to Eaton
et al, I modify the unit of analysis to a variety (a product of a country
in a specic destination) instead of a rm. This analysis is also similar
to the decomposition of Evenett and Venables (2002), but the methodol-
ogy that leads to those results takes together products and destinations
(they analyze them separately) and thus this papers allows for richer in-
teractions, looks at a broader country spectrum, and does a more robust
analysis.
The product level focus on this paper allows for comparisons with
other decompositions that use products as unit of analysis. In partic-
ular I will compare the results with Evenett and Venables (2002) and
Helpman et al (2006).
3 Methodology
The basic idea of the methodology is to analyze exports from three
dimensions: products, destinations, and value within those combinations
of products and destinations. Each unique combination, which I call
varieties or product-destinations (PD)8 are the basic unit of analysis of
the decomposition9. This will allow to decompose the growth of exports
between two points in time into the contribution of new products, new
destinations, and the growth in value of previously exported varieties.
The logic of the decomposition is very simple and is explained using
Graphs 1 and 2 as examples. Graph 1 shows the exports of a hypothetical
country in the base year, t0, in the three dimensions described above.
The X axis measures the number of potential di¤erent products the
country can export; the Y axis measures the number of destinations it
can export to; and the Z axis shows the value exported of each PD10.
Each bar then represents a particular variety or PD exported.
8For example, shoes exported to Canada from a given country are a di¤erent va-
riety from shoes exported to New Zealand from the same country, from the exporters
perspective.
9This idea of variety is analogous to Armington (1969) but from an exporter
perspective. Even though the product might be identical, I want to argue that
exporting a product to one country is a di¤erent thing from exporting the same
product to another country because of the potential di¤erent costs, externalities,
uncertainties, etc. which I discuss in the rest of the paper.
10The maximum number of products and destinations is xed and represents the
total product-destination space available in a year. In the example of the graph each
space has 8 components.
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Graph 2
At t0 the country exports 4 products in 3 destinations . It doesnt
export every product into every destination, but exports each of the 4
products in a subset of the 3 countries. In the example, the country ex-
port 7 varieties. I call the potential number of varieties (12) the country
potential PD space in the base year, and is shown by the vertical and
horizontal dashed lines in the graph, as the lower left quadrant drawn
by those lines. Total exports correspond simply to the sum of the values
exported of all the varieties where value is greater than zero. This is $26
in Graph 1.
The dashed lines that dene the t0 potential PD space allow us to
separate the product space into 4 quadrants, which dene the logic of
possible paths of export growth. These are shown in Graph 2 which
represents export structure at t1 and allows us to understand where
and how much exports have grown between t0 and t1. It shows that
exports have increased to $52 (100 percent increase). First, looking at
the original varieties, some of them continue to be exported in t1 at
higher (or lower) values and some disappear or die. So part of the
growth in exports is due to net growth of the base year variety structure.
In the example, there are 6 surviving varieties that increase their value
from $24 to $33. To this we subtract the value in t0 of the death of
varieties and which are not counted in t1, which in the example is 211,
11In the case of this example the death of product 4 in destination 2 also represents
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and is shown in Graph 2 with a cross. The net growth of the base
structure is then $7. I call this growth of the base variety structure the
intensive margin of growth.
Second, exports grow through the colonization  of new varieties.
These are shown with dark bars in Graph 2. I call the value of the new
varieties the extensive margin of growth, which is basically the value of
new PDs that were not exported in the base year.
Furthermore, one can decompose the extensive margin into 4 dif-
ferent cases, using the four quadrants dened by the base year variety
space. First countries can populate empty spaces in the lower left quad-
rant. This means that countries expand existing products to new des-
tinations for that product but an already known destination for
the country. In graph 2 product #4 in destination #3 with a value of
$2 represents that case. Second, the country can expand their exports
of existing products to new destinations for that product and for the
country. This is seen in the upper left quadrant. In the example there
are 3 new varieties in that case, with a value of $7. The expansion into
the two left quadrants will be dened as new destinations, since it is the
expansion of existing products into new export markets for the product,
be it known or new for the country as a whole. This accounts for for
$9 in the example. Third, exports can be expanded into new products
but into countries already colonized by other products of the country.
This is seen in the expansion to the lower right quadrant in Graph 2.
The country produces 2 new goods (#6 and #7) into existing markets,
but they correspond to 3 varieties, worth $9. Finally, the country can
expand to new products which are exported to new destinations, which
can be seen in the upper right quadrant. The sum of the two right
quadrants will be dened as new products12.The extensive margin can
then be understood as the expansion of exports into new products, new
destinations, or both.
3.1 Decomposition methodology
The graphical decomposition from above can be formalized in the follow-
ing way: a country cs exports to the world in period t1 can be thought
the death of the whole product 4.
12One can easily argue that new products are in fact new destinations too, be-
cause the new products are exported in novell destinations for that product. Despite
this issue I will call the right cuadrant of expansion new products because it is the
di¤erencing characteristic of this part of the expansion.
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of as the followingX
pd2PDt1
Xpd;c;t1 =
X
pd2PDt0^PDt1
Xpd;c;t0  (1 + %Xpd;c;t1=t0)+ (1)
+
X
Xnewpd;c;t1
where
%Xpd;c;t1=t0 =
P
pd2PDt0^PDt1
Xpd;c;t1  
P
pd2PDt0^PDt1
Xpd;c;t0P
pd2PDt0^PDt1
Xpd;c;t0
(2)
and
X
Xnewpd;c;t1 =
X
p2Pt0^t1 ;d2Dt0^t1
pd=2PDt k^pd2PDt
Xpd;c;t1 +
X
p=2Pt0^P2Pt1 ;
d2Dt0^d2Dt1
Xpd;c;t1 + (3)
+
X
p2Pt0^ t1 ;
d=2Dt0^d2Dt1
Xpd;c;t1 +
X
p=2Pt0^p2Pt1 ;
d=2Dt0^d2Dt1
Xpd;c;t1
Equation 1 shows that the sum of the value of each variety pd
(product p and destination d, belonging to the positive value variety set
PD) exported in by country c in t1is the sum of two terms. The rst
term is the value in t0 of the varieties that had positive values in t0
and that are still exported in t1, times one plus its growth between t0
and t1 (which is shown in equation 2). The second term is the exports
of new varieties, which, as already explained, can be decomposed into 4
di¤erent groups (equation 3). The rst term of 3 includes varieties where
the product and the destination were exported in t0 but the combination
wasnt in t0 but was in t1. For example, watches were exported in t0 to
USA and chocolates were exported to Japan, but there were no exports
of chocolates to the US or watches to Japan. But if in t1, the country
starts exporting chocolates to the US this is counted in the rst term.
The second term is composed of completely new products exported to
destinations existing in t0. The third term captures exports of existing
products in t0 but to completely new destinations. Finally the fourth
term includes new products exported to new destinations.
Next, the exports in t0 can be decomposed as follows:X
pd2PDt0
Xpd;c;t0 =
X
pd2PDt0^PDt1
Xpd;c;t0 +
X
pd2PDt0^pd=2PD1
Xpd;c;t0 (4)
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Equation 4 simply separates the total value of exports in t0 of country
c in the sum of the value in t0 of varieties that survive in t1 plus the
varieties that died (varieties that were positive in t0 but not in t).
Taking together 1 and 4, the percentage change in exports of country
c between t0 and t1 yieldsP
pd2PDt1
Xpd;c;t1  
P
pd2PDt0
Xpd;c;t0P
pd2PDt0
Xpd;c;t0
=
P
pd2PDt0^PDt1
Xpd;c;t0  (1 + %Xpd;c;t1=t0) +P
pd2PDt0
Xpd;c;t0
+
P
Xnewpd;c;t1  
 P
pd2PDt0^PDt1
Xpd;c;t0 +
P
pd2PDt0^pd=2PDt1
Xpd;c;t0
!
P
pd2PDt0
Xpd;c;t0
=
P
pd2PDt0^PDt1
Xpd;c;t0 %Xpd;c;t1=t0 +
P
Xnewpd;c;t1  
P
pd2PDt0^pd=2PDt1
Xpd;c;t0P
pd2PDt0
Xpd;c;t0
(5)
Equation 5 shows the decomposition of this paper. Percentage export
growth can be explained then by the growth of surviving varieties (rst
term in the right hand side), by new varieties in each of the 4 quadrants of
the Graphs 1 and 2 (second term), and subtracting deaths that occurred
between t0 and t1, all divided by the exports in the initial period as a
point of comparison13.
The advantages of this methodology are its simplicity; it is additive,
which makes further decompositions and recompositions easy; it takes
into account the weights in countries world exports of each product
and destination e¤ectively into each margin, and allows to capture the
varieties e¤ectively exported. Its main disadvantage is that the part of
the extensive margin
P
Xnewpd that accounts for e¤ective new products
and destinations (the second, third and fourth component of equation
3) is sensitive to the product and destination space occupied by the
country at t0. For example, if a country in year t0 exported to every
single and country, even though it exported each product to a single
13Evennet and Venables (2002) weight the importance of each dividing the growth
of each component by total export growth instead of doing it with respect to the base
year of exports. The problem of doing that ratio separately for each country is that
when export growth is close to zero or negative, the contribution of each component
to growth losses meaning both to compare each component and to compare between
countries. In this paper the contribution of each component to growth is only used
for world or country aggregates to avoid this problem.
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country (assuming that the number of countries is equal to the number
of product categories) and in a small amount, the only way it can grow
is by producing more of the same or by expanding to new destinations
of already colonized countries and products. The contribution of new
destinations and products would be by denition zero. This tends to
be the case of developed economies, which are occupying almost all the
product and destination space since 198414.
Another issue is that it does not weight the space with its importance
in world trade, so if for example the space remaining is 50 percent of
countries and products, the space to grow in exports into those countries
and products can be small if they are small countries and if the products
are scarcely demanded worldwide, even though a variety map would
indicate that it has a lot of places to jump to15.
4 The data
This paper uses the publicly available Feenstra et al (2005) World Trade
Flows database16. This database provides bilateral trade ows for more
than 170 countries. It is the most consistent database created in terms
of exporter ows checked with importer ows, multiple sources of data,
etc.
Unfortunately, the database is disaggregated to 4-digit SITC rev.2,
which impedes us to see a more detailed picture of the decomposition,
particularly of product diversication.
The higher the aggregation the more likely that a new product in
a more disaggregated denition will be classied as an existing product
and thus its value computed as higher value of the existing product.
Also some new products at a higher level of disaggregation that begin
to be exported to di¤erent destinations from the rest of the aggregated
4 digit product will be categorized as new destinations and not as part
of new products17.
14Table A.2.2 in the Appendix shows this in the second and third to last columns.
15A way to solve that would be to make the length and size of each square in the
map proportional to the importance of each country and product to world trade, so
we would have rectangles of di¤erent size that would allow us to better understand
the opportunities of growth or the space occupied by a countrys exports. Hummels
and Klenow (2005) decomposition, corrects for this issue.
16See http:nncid.econ.ucdavis.edu/data/undata/undata.html and Feenstra et al
(2005) to access the database and the paper that explains in detail its construction.
17The second bias should be smaller than the rst one because the new product
at the 6 or 8 digit must be exported to a destination not exported before under the
4 digit denition to be counted as new destination . Otherwise it would be simply
counted as higher value of an old variety.
14
This database is initially treated so as to eliminate exports and im-
ports from territories that are not real territories and those which are
administrative territories of other countries. Also, to eliminate insignif-
icant exports and to make product classications and values of data
comparable through time, any export less than $100,000 is eliminated,
the export value of each variety is transformed into constant US dol-
lars of 200018, and only data starting from 1984 is considered for the
analysis. Finally, to keep the consistency of the destination space, the
countries that were split or merged in the period 1984-2000 are treated
as a single country. This a¤ects Germany, the former Soviet Union,
former Yugoslavia and former Czechoslovakia19.
This leaves the decomposition with 145 countries and a product space
of between 772 and 909 product categories, depending on the year20. Fi-
nally, to make the comparison of di¤erent countries and groups of coun-
tries more tractable and relevant, countries that have less than US$50
million of exports in 1984 or which had less than 2 million inhabitants
were dropped21, leaving the most of the analysis with 112 countries.
5 Main Results
The main results of the decomposition are presented from the most ag-
gregate level to a most detailed level. First, Graph 3 and Table 1 show
the result of the decomposition for aggregate of developing economies ex-
ports 22. The continuous black line shows overall exports per year. The
dashed line indicates the contribution of the 1984 structure to the growth
in exports. The grey line adds the contribution of new destinations as
dened in this paper, so the di¤erence between the two lines reects the
18Nominal exports of each year are deacted by US CPI, from the World Bank
WDI 2006.
19See Appendix 1 and Tables A1, A2 and A3 for a list of eliminated countries and
details on the database treatment.
20For a list of countries see Table A2 in the appendix.
21Nevertheless the exports to these countries included for most of the calculation.
Also for robustness the decomposition is also made with all 145 countries, holding
the basic results almost identical.
22Graph 3 vis constructed from table A.2.1 by weighting the growth of each com-
ponent for each country by the importance of that countrys export in 1984 worlds
exports. The sum of the weighted averages are then divided by worlds export growth
to get the contribution of each component to worlds exports. I took out developed
economies (using the WDI denition of high income economy) since their large weight
in worlds exports biases the decomposition away from the extensive margin, as ex-
plained in the previous section. The Appendix shows the same graph and table for
the world sample, including the developed countries.
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contribution of destinations Finally, the di¤erence between the black
and grey lines represents the contribution of new products. Each year
in the graph corresponds then to the value of developing economies
exports, and export grown in value between 1984 and in any year can
be seen by the vertical distance of total exports in that year with the
horizontal line of 1984 exports.
Developing Economies Exports
1984-2000
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year 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
84 structure -322.0% 4522.4% 47.1% 56.4% 55.5% 62.2% 61.8% 60.3% 57.4% 59.1% 58.6% 56.7% 55.2% 52.8% 53.7% 55.3%
new destinations 353.4% -3821.8% 46.2% 37.9% 38.7% 32.6% 33.1% 33.9% 36.4% 35.4% 35.0% 36.8% 37.8% 39.6% 38.8% 37.4%
new products 68.6% -600.6% 6.7% 5.7% 5.8% 5.2% 5.2% 5.8% 6.2% 6.3% 6.4% 6.5% 7.0% 7.5% 7.5% 7.4%
Total Exp Growth 1.1% -0.2% 25.2% 47.3% 73.2% 104.9% 127.7% 155.0% 176.1% 229.5% 310.5% 364.7% 407.4% 395.0% 449.6% 596.0%
Avg Year Growth 1.1% -0.1% 7.8% 10.2% 11.6% 12.7% 12.5% 12.4% 11.9% 12.7% 13.7% 13.7% 13.3% 12.1% 12.0% 12.9%
Table 1
The result for the full period of analysis can be observed in the
last column of Table 1. From 1984 to 2000 world exports have grown
on average about 13 percent per year. Of that growth, the structure
of 1984s exports the intensive margin represents the bulk of that
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growth at 55.3 percent. Penetration of new destinations and products
the extensive margin account for 44.7 percent of the growth of exports.
Thus, exporting more of what you were exporting in 1984 and in the
same places has had the highest importance in the growth of developing
economiesexports.
What is even more remarkable is that the most important component
of the extensive growth is new destinations, and the apparently low im-
portance of new products in the growth of exports. Of the 44.7 percent
of relevance of the extensive margin, 37.4 percent corresponds to new
destinations and only 7.4 percent to new products23. More than high-
lighting the apparent low relevance of new products, the clear message
seems to be that new destinations are crucial in export growth.
But there are two important caveats: the level of aggregation and the
time frame. On the rst issue, the database used in this paper is built
at the 4 digit level, which is relatively aggregated, considering that there
are other world databases available at 6 or 8 digit level of disaggregation.
The higher the level of product aggregation the higher the chance that
a country has some export in a product of each category to begin with,
and so what are new products in higher levels of disaggregation would
be considered intensive margin or new destinations at lower levels24.
The only way to solve this issue is doing the same analysis with a more
disaggregated database. It would be interesting to test the same analysis
at the 6 or 8 digit level to check for robustness of the results.
The other sensitive issue is the time frame. Sixteen years might be
a short time frame to capture the productive transformation of some
economies and thus reduce the e¤ect in export growth of new products
compared to longer periods25.
Additionally, when comparing the contribution of new products and
new destinations one can argue that it is not fair to compare them
in the way done in the decomposition, because the new product mar-
gin only includes product categories new to the country (the right two
23At a world level these results are even more extreme. The extensive margin
accounts for only 27.2%, of which 24.6% corresponds to new destinations and only
3% to new products. See the rst two groups in Table 2, Table A.2.4 and Graph
A.2.1 in the Appendix.
24Given the extremely low importance of varieties of new products in new destina-
tions (as I will show later), one can argue it is much more likely that new products
will be classied in the extensive margin relative to new destinations, compared to
higher levels of dissagregation.
25Even though Feenstras database covers exports since 1962, as explained in the
appendix there is a reclassication problem that a¤ects several product lines which
articially increases new products starting in 1984. Using a di¤erent database or
accepting to work with even less products can allow a calculation using a longer
timeframe.
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quadrants in Graphs 1 and 2), while new destinations include olddes-
tinations for the country as well (lower left quadrant of Graph 1 and 2).
While conceptually the expansion within the lower left quadrant of graph
1 can be perfectly understood as a new destination for a given product,
the argument can have validity for the sake of comparing e¤ectively new
products never produced before with e¤ectively new destinations, never
reached before, particularly if one assumes that there can be positive
information or network externalities of some kind at the country level,
so exporting into known territory for the country makes it easier for the
rm compared to when no one in the country knows the new market. So
an alternative would be to dene new destinations as being new to the
country as a whole. This would imply understanding new destinations
in way similar to Helpman et al (2006). In the framework of this pa-
per, new products would be dened as the right two quadrants and new
destinations the top two quadrants26. The comparison between the two
under this denition can be seen in Table A.4 and A.5 in the Appen-
dix (last column of each table). The tables show that the importance
of new destinations in growth signicantly decreases, compared to the
basic denition used in the paper. Nevertheless except for the case of
the worst performing countries, new destinations still explain about two
times more of growth than new products.
Going back to the analysis of results, another interesting issue is that
the relevance of each component is relatively robust to comparing 1984
with previous years, that is, taking shorter periods of growth. This can
be seen in Table 1 . The contribution of growth of the extensive margin
increases mildly since 198827. One could expect that as we move ahead
in time since 1984 the contribution of new products and destinations
should increase steadily since there is more time for productive trans-
formation and searching new markets if one assumes that as countries
open their frontiers, develop (or implode) there is a higher chance of
adjusting their productive structure, which takes time28 This does not
26This would imply that for the sake of the comparison the top right quadrant
should be counted in both new destinations and new products. This makes sense
since that quadrant corresponds to new products in new destinations.
27The numbers of the comparison of 1984 with 1985 and 1986 do not have much
meaning since the overall export growth was close to zero or negative. Also the
same growth decomposition starting in every year from 1985 (1985 compared with
every year, 1986 compared with every year, etc) one nds very similar results as the
ones reported after 1986 the table, that is a mild increase in the importance of new
products. These results are not shown in the paper but are available upon request.
28For example, Helpman (2004), argues that a small country which does not a¤ect
its terms of can take advantage of exporting in its competitive advantage sectors and
increase productivity while the capital labor ratio in that sector increases, up to a
point where it is protable to switch to products that are more capital and human
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seem to happen intensively, at least not relative to the importance to
the intensive margin.
At one more level of dissaggregation, Table 2 analyzes margins by
groups of countries. Each component of the decomposition can be seen
in columns (2) to (7). There are three things to highlight. First, there is
a consistent order of importance of the di¤erent components of the de-
composition, the most important being the growth of the 1984 structure,
then growth into new destinations in known products and destinations
for the country, followed by new destinations in existing products, new
products in existing destinations and new products in new destinations29.
It seems to be easier for countries to grow in known territorysince
almost with no exception the highest rates of growth within components
are from the existing varieties that survived. In second place the pen-
etration of new (already colonized) markets in existing products, and
far below, new destinations and products. Also, the contribution of new
destinations is consistently high, particularly for developing economies,
although lower than the intensive margin growth.
capital intensive. Thus, small countries should expect to diversify to these physical
and human capital intensive sectors.
29Countries have almost no growth in new products in new destinations.
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1984-2000 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (2) - (3) (4) + (5) (6) + (7)
Real Export
Growth
growth of
surviving
varieties
death of 1984
varieties
new destinations
of known
countries and
products
new
destinations,
existing
products
 new products,
known
destinations
new products
and
destinations
net growth of
1984 varieties
(intensive)
new
destinations
(extensive)
new
products
(extensive)
Full Sample *
total 1 479% 357% 10% 88% 30% 13% 2% 347% 118% 14%
contribution
to (1) 2 - 74.5% 2.1% 18.3% 6.2% 2.7% 0.3%
72.4% 24.6% 3.0%
Filtered sample
total 1 486% 365% 11% 87% 30% 13% 2% 354% 118% 14%
contribution
to (1) 2
- 75.0% 2.2% 18.0% 6.2% 2.6% 0.3% 72.8% 24.2% 3.0%
Developing economies
total 1 596% 346% 16% 164% 59% 39% 5% 329% 223% 44%
contribution
to (1) 2
- 58.0% 2.7% 27.4% 9.9% 6.5% 0.9% 55.3% 37.4% 7.4%
Developed economies
total 1 428% 362% 7% 55% 17% 1% 0% 355% 72% 1%
contribution
to (1) 2 - 84.7% 1.7% 12.8% 4.0% 0.3% 0.0% 82.9% 16.7% 0.3%
Top 20 Developing
total 1 1169% 689% 11% 310% 110% 63% 9% 678% 419% 72%
contribution
to (1) 2 - 58.9% 1.0% 26.5% 9.4% 5.4% 0.7%
58.0% 35.9% 6.2%
Rank 21-40 Developing
total 1 437% 217% 20% 137% 51% 46% 5% 197% 189% 51%
contribution
to (1) 2 - 49.7% 4.5% 31.5% 11.7% 10.6% 1.0%
45.1% 43.2% 11.7%
Rank 41-60 Developing
total 1 244% 143% 20% 78% 20% 18% 3% 124% 99% 21%
contribution
to (1) 2
- 58.8% 8.0% 32.1% 8.3% 7.5% 1.3% 50.8% 40.4% 8.8%
Worse 20 Developing
total 1 87% 64% 29% 32% 8% 11% 2% 35% 40% 13%
contribution
to (1) 2
- 73.1% 33.0% 36.7% 8.9% 12.4% 2.0% 40.1% 45.5% 14.4%
* without country filters of population or minimum export value in 1984. For the rest of the calculation the filter is applied unless stated.
1 To aggregate countries I weighted the growth of each by its importance to the 1984 exports of the relevant full group being compared
2 contribution to (1) simply divides each column by column (1)
Note: The values for USA correspond to 1999, due to an error in the Feenstra Database for the 2000 values, which account for less than half of the countries exported by the US in previous years
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Table 2
Second, when comparing developed and developing economies, the
former have grown faster in the old structure than the latter. However,
developing economies grew much faster in new destinations and prod-
ucts. As already explained, this is probably partly due more to statistical
reasons than economic or technological, given that developed economies
have little chance to expand into new products or destinations 30. Over-
all, the importance of the extensive margin is substantially higher in
developing economies.
30The exception to this is the expansion in known destinations and products but
in new combinations, where again developing economies grow much faster than de-
veloped ones (column (4) in the table).
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Finally, comparing groups in terms of their export growth, fastest
growing countries grew faster in every component than other lower grow-
ing groups and have lower death rates as a percent of 1984 exports. The
highest export growth countries grew on average more in every com-
ponent than the second 20, those that were 20-40 grew more in every-
thing than those in positions 40-60 and the latter grew more than the
worse performing countries. Looking in more detail one can see the bet-
ter performing countries had less deaths (in value) and more growth of
surviving and new varieties. Another interesting issue is that although
growing faster in more successful exporters, the relative relevance of new
products is lower in more successful economies. This can be seen in the
second row of the last column of the table of each of the four groups.
A more detailed comparison can be seen in table 3, which takes the
ratio of the growth of each component of the best 20 performers and
compares it with the other groups in the ranking. For example, col-
umn (1) shows that the best performerstotal exports grew 2.7 times
faster than those in the rank 20-40 and 13 times faster than the worst
performing group. These ratios allow us to assess which component of
the decomposition had a higher di¤erential growth and thus a higher
di¤erential contribution to export growth when comparing the best per-
forming countries with the rest. Intuitively one might think that the
countries with fastest growing exports should have grown di¤erentially
faster in new products, but the data doesnt show this. Looking at the
individual components of the decomposition (columns (1) - (7)) surviving
varieties (column (2)) and particularly completely new destinations (col-
umn (4)) had a higher di¤erential growth when compared to the lower
performing countries. When compared to the worse performers what
made the most di¤erence was the growth in new destinations. When
one aggregates to the 3 dimensions used in the paper (last 3 columns
of Table 2), one can assess that the net growth in 1984 structure made
the highest di¤erence in growth, while new destinations grew di¤eren-
tially faster than new products, again conrming the importance of new
destinations in export growth.
Relation of decomposition components of Top 20 Developing economies with lower perfoming groups
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (2) - (7) (5) + (6) (3) + (4)
total
exports
surviving
varieties
new varieties in
old destinations
and products
new dest,
old
products
new prod,
known dest
new prod,
new dest
death of
varieties
1984
structure
New
Products
New
Destinations
average yearly
growth 17.2% 13.8% 9.2% 4.7% 3.1% 0.5% 11.3% 13.7% 3.4% 10.8%
20-40 2.68 3.18 2.25 2.15 1.36 1.90 0.57 3.44 1.41 2.22
40-60 4.79 4.81 3.95 5.43 3.45 2.76 0.58 5.47 3.35 4.26
worse 20 13.39 10.79 9.68 14.21 5.85 4.99 0.39 19.36 5.74 10.56
Relation
with
Table 3
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Finally, we can analyze this decomposition at the country level. Ta-
bles A2.1 and A2.2 show them in detail, but a clearer one shot picture
can be seen in graphs 4 and 5. 31.
Graph 4
Graph 4 compares the extensive and intensive margin of growth.
The main regularity observed is that there is no regularity. Fast growing
countries as well as slow growing countries in exports achieve their out-
come, some more through the intensive and others through the extensive
margin. However, when decomposing the extensive margin (Graph 5)
we see that the vast majority of countries grow more through new des-
tinations compared with new products, as already been shown in the
country group and world tables.
31Table A2.1 and A2.2 show the same decomposition but using di¤erent bases.
The former simply account for overall growth of each component with respect to the
1984 export level of each country. Table A2.2 weights that growth by the overall
growth of the country, and makes the di¤erent components easier to compare, but
makes the cases of countries that overall grow little or decline less interpretable.
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Graph 5
Finally, given the high relevance of the intensive margin, one can
provide a hypothetical exercise to analyze this determinant in particu-
lar. One possible reason for di¤erent growth rates in old varieties could
have simply been that there was a di¤erent dynamism in those markets
between countries. So one way to analyze how the intensive growth was
achieved is to decompose the intensive growth between what that growth
would have been had the country kept its 1984 market share in each of
the varieties it was exporting to the e¤ective growth in the intensive
margin. The di¤erence can be attributed to a market share increasing
e¤ort. If a country grew more than what its 1984 market share implied,
there is a positive contribution of e¤ort, or an average increase in market
share. If it grew less, there was negativee¤ort. This exercise is shown
in graph 6. The position in the X axis indicates how fast would 1984
exports (the intensive margin) grow simply if countries kept the market
shares they had of the products they exported in the countries they did.
So the position is an indicator for the country of how dynamic was its
1984 export market in the next 16 years. The Y axis shows how much
did the intensive margin grow in practice.
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Graph 6
Note: the line is a 45 degree line, so if a country is above the line,
it means it increase its weighted average market share. The vertical
distance with the 45 degree line shows the part of the intensive margin
attributable to e¤ortor an increase in the average market share.
The graph shows two things. First, countries who were better lo-
catedtend to grow faster in intensive growth. That is, simply keeping
the market shares of 1984 allows some countries to grow much faster in
exports than others. For example, maintaining its 1984 market share,
Korea grew much faster than Iraq which also kept its market share. The
di¤erence is that Koreas varieties were much more dynamic than Iraqs.
Had Iraq wanted to grow in the intensive margin as much as Korea it
would have had to signicantly increase its market share in its product-
destinations so as to grow more than several times faster than what it
did, which in all likelihood would be something much more di¢ cult than
it was for Korea. Given the positive correlation in the graph, it suggests
that on average countries took the advantage of more dynamic sectors
of export allowing them to grow faster in the intensive margin. So one
reason the countries that grew faster in the intensive margin were able
to achieve that growth was because the markets where they were selling
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their products experienced faster growth, and just keeping their market
share allowed them to grow much faster in the extensive margin than
less luckycountries.
Additionally, the graph shows that some countries kept their market
shares, some did an extra e¤ortand some wasted the opportunity and
made a negative e¤ort32 Among the countries that increased their av-
erage market share in their old varieties, growing even faster than what
the market share would indicate, China outperforms all others.
In sum, the main ndings of the decomposition are the following:
 At a (developing) world average, original varieties represent the
bulk of the cause of export growth. New destinations are a very
relevant source of growth, even more important than new products.
This is robust to di¤erent denitions of new destinations and to
di¤erent country groups .Moreover, aggregating across the world
and in country groups there is a consistent order of relevance of
di¤erent components of the extensive margin of the decomposition
for explaining growth.
 New products account for a small percentage of export growth.
Within them, new destinations are even more seldomly colonized
as compared to existing destinations. Nevertheless this can be
sensitive to the level of aggregation of data and the time frame
used in the paper.
 The fastest export growing countries grow faster in every compo-
nent but di¤erentially faster in destinations as compared to lower
export growth countries.
 The growth of markets in the varieties originally exported by each
country seems to have contributed in an important way to the
intensive growth of countriesexports.
How do these results compare with the relevant empirical
literature?
32In practice, this clearly depends on each particular country. Some countries
that transformed their productive structures (because of economic liberalization)
and moved into new products could be below the 45 degree line because they stop
exporting products that where the country did not have a comparative advantage.
That could be the case of former Yugoslavia.
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These results, particularly the aggregated ones, can be directly com-
pared to two papers in the literature.
First, the ndings are similar to Evenett and Venables (2002), who
nd that new products account for close to 9 percent, new destinations
34 percent and the remaining 57 percent in intensive margin. These
values are very similar to the values I obtain for the developing economy
sample. This is impressive taking into account that the Evenett paper
uses a very di¤erent time frame, a much smaller sample of countries, and
more aggregated data.
Second, we can compare the results to Helpman et al (2006) paper,
where they acknowledge that a small percentage of export growth comes
from new destinations, and criticize the Evenett results as being non
representative and considering many more cases into new destinations
than what they should considering Helpman et al methodology. First,
using the full sample of 145 countries (rst result in Table 2) one still nd
that 25 percent of export growth is attributable to new destinations, so
in this sense the critique is not valid. Moreover, the sample of Evennet
and Venables (2002) is not representative but still the results hold in the
sense that destinations are important with a more representative sample.
Second, Helpmans methodology assumes that new destinations are the
proportion of export growth that belongs to countries that didnt have
two way trade in 1970. That is countries who did not export between
them in 1970 or where only one side did. New destinations in their de-
nition are thus exports of my country to new countries that were not
present in my export basket in 1970. If my country didnt export any
product with a certain country in 1970 and later did (not mattering if
the other country did or did not export to mine), this would be extensive
margin for Helpman. If my country did export to another country but
the other country did not this would also be extensive margin. Using
the decomposition of this paper we can modify what new destinations
mean and dene it as the upper quadrants of Graph 1, that is, export
to completely new destinations, be they of old or new products, one has
a very similar denition to Helpmans33 Moreover, given that Evenetts
results for 1970-97 are similar to mine, I use my adjusted results and
compare them with Helpmans. This is shown in table A.5 in the ap-
pendix34. . The extensive-new destinations margin under Helpmans
33However, compared to Helpmans denition, the one used here biases the results
against new destinations because it takes one way trade exports in the base year
(with no imports from that country) as extensive, while I take them as intensive or
at least not part of new destinations.
34The relevant comparison is seen in the rst two rows, under the full sample
results, and under the fth column (new destinations (extensive))
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more restrictive denition using this papers database accounts for only
6.6 percent of export growth of 1984-2000. This is very similar to what
he nds out to be the extensive growth of exports, and suggests that
their conjecture was right in the sense that a lot of what Evenett consid-
ered new destinations were already countries trading with one another
in other products, and thus part of Helpmans intensive margin.
How do these results compare with the theory?
From a trade theory perspective new destinations at the product or
country level can be explained most straightforwardly with the most
recent rm level models when you have gravity and xed costs of ex-
porting. Helpmans model is the most complete model that ts di¤erent
ndings about destinations. Their model includes home and destination
country specic xed costs of exporting. If destination market size is
small and distant, the protability of entering that market for a given
product will be smaller than larger and closer markets. It is then possi-
ble for a country simply not to trade with another or to trade only some
products if the xed costs are high enough relative to the protability of
exporting there before those xed costs are incurred. From a dynamic
perspective, however, what would make a country enter new markets?
Ceteris paribus, if the home country grows, the bigger size (which for
a Melitz (2003) model would imply higher aggregate productivity, for
example) can allow marginal rms to enter new destinations that didnt
enter before if they overcome the corresponding threshold of that coun-
try. If this rm is the rst in a product category to enter a country,
that would be observed in my results. Also, if other markets grow, the
bigger size of that market will make protable for some rms to start ex-
porting there, given their productivity, after incurring in the xed costs.
Also, it is possible that the home or foreign countries change policies
that make the xed or variable costs of exporting there lower. So, in
principle, recent theories of trade can explain patterns of export growth
penetration.
But over time, variables that a¤ect gravity change slowly, particularly
country size, which makes it di¢ cult to reconcile it with the relevance
of new destinations for export growth found in this paper. If, as most
recent models assume, rms draw a certain productivity ex ante, they
will know to which markets to export given the cost of entering them,
and so they will enter the most protable ones immediately (typically the
larger and closer ones). Thus when you measure an existing product it
should be the case that product has entered the most important markets
for that product, so it is strange to nd a very important relevance
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of new destinations if rms only colonize the next marginally inferior
market as compared to the previous ones. Moreover, the importance
of new destinations also holds on average for short periods of time (5
years for example) as Table 1 shows, so for all the world, country groups
and most individual countries the variables in these models should have
moved rapidly in order for the contribution of growth of new destinations
to be signicant. This is unlikely. One can conjecture that something
else might ease the process of entering new markets.
One hypothesis is that some these xed costs have important infor-
mation externalities. As expressed in Melitz (2003) there are several
informational (and explicit) and coordination costs rms must incur to
successfully start exporting a product in a new country, which makes this
costs signicant35. But it is possible to think that several of them can
have positive externalities. For example, once consumers begin to know
and buy products from a given country (if they are good) it is more likely
that they will buy similar products from that country. The information
about regulation, idiosyncrasy, ways of doing business, etc., many times
is shared among exporters (particularly in developing economies that are
not too large and where exporters do not compete between them for the
exact same market share)36. Some of these costs are probably country
specic, others sector or product specic and others rm specic. Prob-
ably the existence of such externalities are higher for country or sector
level common costs and less for rm level xed costs.
The existence of such externalities would have policy implications
and would allow to disentangle a second dimension to the idea of self
discovery costs proposed by Hausmann and Rodrik (2003). In their
paper they argue for several cost of both discovering a new product and
exporting it successfully37. In that sense, Hausmann and Rodrik mix
35A rm must nd and inform foreign buyers about its product and learn about
the foreign market. It must then research the foreign regulatory environment and
adapt its product to ensure that it conforms to foreign standards (which include
testing, packaging, and labeling requirements). An exporting rm must also set up
new distribution channels in the foreign country and conform to all the shipping rules
specied by the foreign customs agency." (Melitz (2003)).
36For example, Vettas(2000) models foreign demand for new products as endoge-
nous, in that it is an increasing function of past sales due to learning on the part
of consumers. However, the initial investment required to penetrate a new market,
stimulate demand, and learn the markets potential size will su¤er similar appro-
priability problem as Hausmann and Rodrik (2003) s self discovery: imitators can
free ride, leading to underinvestment by entrepreneurs. But once someone makes the
investment it is cheaper for all to enter. This type of model has not been tested yet.
37This, from a developing economy perspective.
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both issues38. Exporting a completely new product involves exporting
to a new destination, thus it would entail both costs and externalities of
discovering a new product and a new destination for that product The
nature and the characteristic of those costs of exporting are might be
policy relevant. Connecting this with the framework of this paper, self
discovery would be located in the right 2 quadrants of Graph 1 and 2,
because it entails exporting a new product. However, if this hypothesis
is true, entering the top right quadrant should be harder than entering
the bottom right, because you have to completely discover both the
product and the destination. The left two quadrants would only have the
component of discoveries that have to do with penetrating markets with
your product, which are can argue has a smaller cost and uncertainty
than discovering a product. An alternative (although not necessarily
substitute) explanation could simple be that the new potential markets
are also the most distant and small and that would explain why those
regions explain less export growth than the lower quadrants.
Thus, one interpretation of the export growth decomposition could
be that it seems that introducing new products is much more di¢ cult
than introducing old products, and that introducing products in new
markets is easier than doing it in already colonized ones, and this could
be explained in part by costs of discovery and market penetration which
have positive externalities, together with gravity. Then, e¤orts should
be taken to understand those di¢ culties better, particularly if, as some
papers show, what you export and the range of variety that you export
matters. Disentangling these costs for destinations is beyond the scope
of this paper but would be interesting as follow up work, and could allow
for more specic policy implications.
38For example, Hausmann and Rodrik (2006) with respect to self discovery costs
argue that "coordination failures and spillovers are more acute for new activities than
for already established ones. In the rst place (...) new activities are hard to develop
unless their suppliers are present, but why would the suppliers exist if they have
nobody to sell to. Secondly, by denition, new activities must incur self-discovery
costs. And nally, they cannot nd workers with experience in the new activity, since
the activity has not been in existence and hence has not been hiring and training
workers for it. "
At the same time, Hausmann and Rodrik (200?) claim that "A rm must nd and
inform foreign buyers about its product and learn about the foreign market. It must
then research the foreign regulatory environment and adapt its product to ensure
that it conforms to foreign standards (which include testing, packaging, and labeling
requirements). An exporting rm must also set up new distribution channels in the
foreign country and conform to all the shipping rules specied by the foreign customs
agency. "
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6 Additional facts about destinations
Given the relevance that I nd for new destinations, I would like to
extend my analysis in that direction, still in a descriptive dimension,
showing 2 extensions partly based on my methodology of decomposition
a) reaching signicant number of markets seems to be more
di¢ cult for small and less developed countries, even in rela-
tively competitive products.
Hummels and Klenow (2005) estimate a relation between GDP size
and a weighted average of destinations per product39. But can we ex-
tend this relation if we are looking at the products that have some level
of comparative advantage of each country? In other words, should prod-
ucts for which the country is relatively good at producing also reach
a di¤erent number of destinations depending on the size and wealth of
that country? Using simple estimates the answer seems to be yes. Tak-
ing all the products for which each country has a revealed comparative
advantage (RCA) greater than one, the size of the country measured by
total GDP in the corresponding year as well as the level of development
and overall productivity, measured by GDP per capita in each year are
signicant40. The following table shows the estimates
39They found that there was a positive elasticity of 0.1 with respect to size.
40RCA is dened as the importance of a given product in the exports of country i,
divided by the importance of world exports of that product into total world exports.
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dependent variable: log number of destinations of products with RCA>1
2000 1995 1990 1985 panel
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
lpib 0.524 0.175 0.135 0.496 0.167 0.132 0.457 0.124 0.098 0.422 0.111 0.088 0.116
(109.25)** (38.82)** (27.81)** (108.26)** (40.47)** (29.14)** (90.31)** (29.55)** (21.69)** (79.84)** (24.35)** (18.70)** (100.05)**
lpibpc 0.132 0.112 0.123 0.102 0.135 0.104 0.173 0.151 0.116
(19.21)** (17.64)** (18.44)** (15.82)** (19.41)** (19.41)** (21.96)** (20.57)** (68.66)**
lvalueporprod 0.364 0.392 0.379 0.404 0.41 0.43 0.428 0.442 0.414
(106.94)** (84.05)** (108.53)** (85.16)** (114.89)** (89.78)** (103.76)** (83.39)** (343.1)**
Product fe no no yes no no yes no no yes no no yes no
Product*Year fe no no no no no no no no no no no no yes
Observations 12296 12296 12296 12155 12155 12155 11574 11574 11574 11056 11056 11056 199866
Adj R-squared 0.49 0.76 0.85 0.49 0.77 0.86 0.41 0.76 0.84 0.37 0.71 0.85
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
dependent variable: log effective number of destinations of products with RCA>1
2000 1995 1990 1985 panel
(14) (15) (16) (17) (18)
lpib 0.086 0.09 0.07 0.068 0.08
(16.59)** (18.98)** (15.32)** (14.67)** (74.06)**
lpibpc 0.104 0.088 0.098 0.135 0.103
(15.37)** (13.02)** (14.47)** (18.89)** (64.00)**
lvalueporprod 0.15 0.163 0.184 0.186 0.169
(30.30)** (32.94)** (38.24)** (35.88)** (149.71)**
Product fe yes yes yes yes no
Product*Year fe no no no no yes
Observations 12296 12155 11574 11056 199866
Adj R-squared 0.55 0.58 0.59 0.6 0.6
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Table 4
The estimations show that countries that are twice as larger tend to
export products with RCA> 1 to between 7 and 13% more destinations,
using the results of regressions with controls and xed e¤ects. This
coe¢ cients are similar to those found by Hummels and Klenow for the
whole set of products. However I am controlling for GDP per capita and
the value of the exported product trying to control for proxies of average
e¢ ciency and productivity in the economy (which is the typical factor
that subsumes that rms in bigger countries tend to be more productive)
and the scale of production, plus the use of xed e¤ects.The signicance
holds if we take as dependent variable, not the number of destinations
but the e¤ective number of destinations, using a Herfhindal index for
their construction41 (see second panel of regressions).
How can the relatively more competitive products only be sold to a
41For each product exported with RCA>1 for each country in every year I use the
classical denition used for example in measuring the e¤ective number of political
parties in the political science literature: effdestj = 1P
i=n
 
xiP
i=n
xi
!2 where n is the
total number of destinations of product j, and i is a particular destination of product
j.
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fraction of markets if my economy is smaller? One possible explanation
could be that some products could naturally have more value per unit of
weight and developed economies might sell more of these products and
they reach further markets more easily. Additionally, for some types of
products it might be more protable to sell them to some entry markets
and those markets can distribute them to the rest, and for others it
might be more logical to sell them to every market separately. However,
I try to take that into account by introducing product xed e¤ects to
the regression, as well as time xed e¤ects. 42.
Alternative hypotheses that can explain the above are that it is possi-
ble that competitive products in big and developed economies are simply
more productive because of a broader distribution of productivity for the
country given its size and average productivity. We might be observing
products that represent the most productive draws from that distri-
bution, and this might not be captured by the income per capita con-
trol. The average productivity and the right tail in developing economies
might not be enough to reach far markets. A di¤erent explanation could
be that bigger and wealthier countries probably establish more commer-
cial relations and trade agreements with more countries than smaller
and less developed because there are more countries that are trying to
trade with them. This could be a type of networks e¤ect that can have
impact on information, tari¤ and non tari¤ barriers and transportation
for exporting less popular countries.
An additional possible explanation can be obtained from the ndings
of Eaton Kortum and Kramarz (2005). Analyzing french rms they nd
that the number of markets a rm serves is proportional to the sales of
that rm in the home market. This provides some light on why the size
of the home country GDP can be signicant in predicting the number
of destinations reached by competitive products. On average the home
sales of competitive exporting rms should be smaller in smaller coun-
tries. Moreover, in small, open and natural resource based economies,
often there is almost no market for the RCA products, particularly in
raw materials. The question again is why, and if it is strictly necessary
for rms to be big in domestic markets. But anyway, if this relation
holds for all countries, by controlling for the volume exported by the
42A variable that was not incorporated to the regression is distance and the desti-
nation countries GDP and wealth. However, there shouldnt be a big relation between
the size of a country and the average distance with the rest of the world. Also, if
I incorporate the average distance of the existing trade partners I am not taking
into account the partners that the country is not trading with and which should be
relevant for why the country is not exporting with them. Due to gravity and xed
costs one can expect that for any product, the countries that it is traded with are
the closest and largest.
32
product, the estimations could be indirectly controlling by the rms size
in the country, which would again indicate that there is something ad-
ditional about size beyond the sales of the product that pushes to reach
more destinations43.
I am not able to tell which of if these (or other) stories are behind this
regularity, but it is interesting in itself that the competitive products of
most countries reach only a few destinations compared to bigger ones.
b) An important percentage of exports of new varieties are
sporadic and look like experiments.
If we analyze the extensive margin, this is all the new varieties ex-
ported since 1984 in each country and we sort them by the number of
years they were exported, a signicant number of them were exported
only in one occasion and never again in the database. This holds if we
increase the cuto¤ from $100,000 to $1,000,000 per product to try to
increase the signicance of the export. The distribution shifts to the left
but the mean is still above 30% of all new varieties exported in the period
1984-2000 (see graph 7 below). This suggests that the process of enter-
ing new markets has a signicant component of trial and error and that
failure is very common. Moreover, this seems a pervasive phenomenon
worldwide.
Percentage of new varieties that last only one year. World data:
Cuto¤ countries (obs) Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
100,000 145 .38 .12 .15 .70
1,000,000 145 .31 .10 .14 .71
43I am obviously assuming that products that reach more markets have on average
rms that reach more markets, and thus have should have higher sales in the home
market if the relation found in Eaton et al (2005) holds.
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Graph 7
This also suggests that there might not only exist destination specic
xed costs of exporting but that they might be uncertain. Otherwise ex-
porters would have known ex ante if their productivity was enough to
penetrate a given new market with their product and be protable. To
e¤ectively prot from new markets, a given product must often be exper-
imented in a new market. Firms are likely to not know the real demand
of their product, the tastes of consumers, the trustability of distribution
channels, etc., so they probably face important uncertainties44 Thus, to
e¤ectively establish exports of a product in a new country rms have to
overcome not only the typical xed costs but the uncertainty costs of
learning if your product is viable45.
44Eslava et al frame this issue as a probable learning period in which buyers try out
the product in a very limited scale. The idea of a period of exploration is consistent
with that of cost uncertainty. With respect to scale however, the fact that the
distribution of experimentation does not change much between a cuto¤ of $100,000
and 1 million dollars casts some doubt into that argument.
The idea of demand uncertainty in demand has been modelled by Vettas (2000),
where it is unknown ex-ante, depends on past sales (learning) and investment in
knowing the demand has appropriability problems.
45Obviously, with the database used I cannot know or infer if the rm or rms
that exported this products had other products exported in the same country, but
on average this seem unlikely given the small number of rms that export more than
one product (see Bernard et al 2007). This would not not be true the rms that
experiment with products in new markets are those who export multiproducts. I
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Graph 8 shows the same world average of the percentage one shot
exporters but separated by year of occurrence. It shows that if we take
a one year period (1999) close to 60% of the new varieties were not ex-
ported the following year. If we take a two year period (1998 bar) almost
50% of the new varieties in 1998 were not exported in the following two
years. If we move farther away in time the lower the % of one shots.
This is expected because there is more time to experiment or try again
the same or a similar product under the same category, in which case
the variety will not be a one shot anymore. If one assumes that an ac-
ceptable time to call an export an experiment is if the product was not
exported for 3 or 4 years after a trial, the data shows that around 40%
of new varieties are one-shots. It is also likely that in the cases where
there is another experiment after 3 or more years, it is not the same rm
the one who tries to penetrate the market again. So it is probable that if
instead of analyzing products we moved to the rm level the percentages
would be even higher.
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The high prevalence of one shot exporters (at the rm level) has
already been described by Eaton et al (2007) for the case of Colombian
rms in 1996-2005. They nd that in every year most new exporters
do not continue doing so. However they do not discriminate if the new
rms are exporting new or old varieties. Since I cannot look at old What
I am showing here is that not mattering if the underlying rm(s) has
dont know of any literature that has analyzed this.
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exported before, there is a relatively high chance of failure when entering
a new market a new or old product for the rst time, which is a di¤erent
nding theirs.
Finally, again, the percentage of failures of new varieties seems to
be correlated with country size. A simple plot of this percentage with
GDP per capita in the beginning of the period of analysis (1984) shows
a negative relation. A simple regression shows also that GDP per capita
doesnt seem to a¤ect this. Again, further research is needed to disen-
tangle among several hypothesis sustaining this relation (if robust)46.
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dep var: % of coef t-test
one shot exports 84-00
log gdpv -0.09 -8.5
log gdppc -0.02 -0.69
N 124
R2-adjusted 0.43
Current trade theory, analyzed in section 2. does not take uncer-
tainty and experimentation into account. The uncertainty is typically
about productivity before entering the industry, not about entering a
new market. Firms do not export if the xed cost of getting into a coun-
try are higher than the net prot before those xed cost. They do not
experiment. This nding suggest they do, and opens questions about the
dynamics and barriers of penetration of new markets that are interesting
pursuing as a potential line of research.
7 Conclusions
This paper shows that destinations matter in export growth. Moreover,
the di¢ culties of entering markets seem to be crucial at the product
46Again country size in terms of the robustness of the market and the competiteve-
ness rms face, together with network e¤ects (better information of the markets rms
are penetrating) might be a possible explanation. Also it might be possible that the
type of products exported by smaller economies are less di¤erentiable or have some
other characteristic that makes them more prone to failure.
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level. Decomposing export growth through a simple though insightful
methodology indicates that after the growth in value of old varieties,
geographic expansion at the product-destination level explains a signif-
icant percentage of world and countries export growth in the period
1984-2000. Perhaps suprisingly typical focus on product innovation,
new destinations for existing products contributes substantially more to
export growth than new products. It also adds some interesting em-
pirical facts about the apparent di¢ culty of entering new markets, as
countries only colonize a small portion of their known product and des-
tination space, as the most competitive products of most countries only
reach a few destinations and as the process of entering a new market
seems to suggest important uncertainties of success, once the decision to
export is made.
The relevance of destinations for growth in this 16 year period is not
easily explained by the theory, suggesting that there might be potential
informational externalities to the cost of exporting, at the product and
country level, that can have relevant policy implications. Although only
a hypothesis, assessing the relative importance of gravity and these po-
tential externalities on the dynamics of product penetration, testing is
a natural avenue of further work. A second potential direction is an in
depth analysis of the uncertainties of product penetration and how they
relate to country level as well as rm level variables, together with desti-
nation rm level variables. Does the rate of failure of introduction of new
varieties depend on the type of product and the quadrant of colonization
of this papers framework? What is the interaction of di¤erential costs
of entering markets, externalities, and the rate of failure? And, nally,
what is the role for policy?
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9 Appendix 1: Database treatment
The original Feenstra database was adjusted in the following ways to
work in this paper.
1 - I dropped any observation that had less than $100,000 2000 US$
to eliminate exports that are too small to be considered exports to a
given country of a given product. This threshold is introduced on the
one hand to reduce the likelihood of misclassied exports or extremely
low values which would not be considered economically an export of a
country to another one. On the other hand, Feenstras database for
the years 1984-2000 eliminates was acquired with values of more than
$100,000 per transaction, but after adjustments made to the database
there were several registries of less than 100,000. The elimination of
these low values helps keep consistency with that initial data problem.
2 - Another issue that signicantly a¤ected the time frame used in
this paper is a reclassication of products from SITC rev.1 to SITC
rev.2 that happened in 1984. When dealing with product lines, one
usually has to confront the critic of how to di¤erentiate new products
from simply the opening of aggregated product categories into some
more dissaggregated. While it is impossible to solve this issue with
certainty given the size of the dataset used, one can look at major shifts
of product lines and correct to try to make the database as consistent
as possible. There is one main change in product composition and that
happens in 1984, year when the product classication changed. Until
1983 the classication used was SITC rev 1, and starting from 1984 the
SITC rev.2 began to be used. Despite the fact that the whole dataset
has been homologated for SITC rev. 2, a simple analysis of the product
categories of world exports reveals that several unique product lines were
opened into a wider range of product categories, starting in 1984.
This would account for new products in the decomposition exercise but
they were simply reclassication of product categories, and thus bias the
results towards new products. For example, several product categories
that were simply a 3 digit category with a 0 (for example 5870) were
opened into 5 or more categories (for example 5871, 5872, 5875, 5879,
etc) while the original category was emptied. This process was not
automatic but most of the adjustment was done in 1984. For this reason
I decided to use the period 1984-2000 for my analysis. An alternative
could have been the extending the analysis back to 1962, but decreasing
the number of product lines. But since I am working already at the
4 digit level of dissaggregation, I thought it was too costly in terms of
aggregating even more any diversication into the same categories and
imputing them to existing or new varieties. What I can do to and plan
to for a possible second version is doing a similar analysis for the period
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1962-1983 independent of the period 1984-2000 to see if results change
signicantly or not.
3- Starting in 1984, year in which the classication system changed
from SITC rev.1 to SITC rev.2, the database contains several exports
for which the sitc4 code contains one or more X or an A, and not only
numbers47. This is due to exports which at the 3 digit level are higher
than the sum at 4 digit (the same happens accordingly between 1 and 2
digits and 2 and 3 digits). They are given an X if there are other codes
at the 4 digit and an A if the only exports reported are at the 3 digit.
Both types of adjustment have been erased for the e¤ects of this study
because they do not represent a particular product and add noise to the
number of product categories. See Feenstra et. al. (2005) for details
3- I dropped a series of countries which were not countries but aux-
iliary denitions or territories which were adminstrative zones of other
countries. I also dropped Yemen and its previous two separated coun-
tries.
4- I am going to assume for simplicity and for consistency through
time that countries that were divided after the initial date of analysis are
still the same country. This a¤ects Czech Republic, Slovakia, all former
Yugoslavia and all former USSR. This is probably a strong assumption to
make because when this countries were formed, they became, well, new
countries, with their own laws, legislation, barriers, government, which
implies that to export to them certain innovations must be made. On
the other hand if something, it biases the importance of new destinations
downward. So any estimation of its relevance in world exports will be
conservative under these assumptions.
5- A particular case under this adjustment is Germany. This is the
opposite case, where two countries were merged into one. In this case
also to keep consistency through time I am going to assume that both
were one country for the whole period. The alternative would be to
eliminate East Germany. The rst choice also pushes results away from
the relevance of new export destinations.
6- I am dropping countries that for my base year had less than $50
million in total exports and if they had a population of less than 2
million. The idea of this is to take out countries that are too small or
which begin with such low exports that any opening of the economy
makes their export growth look articially enormous. I do my analysis
also dropping this assumption and the results are almost identical.
The list of countries that are dropped due to each reason are pre-
sented in Table A-1. The number of observations and export value lost
47Also there is couple of data points that have an empty SITC code, which were
eliminated.
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due to this adjustments (except number 648) are presented in Table A-2.
7- Important countries like France, Belgium and Switzerland have
their exports added with Monaco, Luxemburg and Liechtenstein respec-
tively. I am assuming for simplicity that the exports correspond only to
the larger countries.
48The reason why I am not counting these countries is that I use them for all the
calculations, except for the nal estimations. Exports of every country include those
to these countries.
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Appendix Tables 
 
 
 
Table A-1
Territories initially dropped from the analysis
Auxiliary Countries Overseas Territories
Afr.Other NS Bermuda
Africa N.NES Br.Antr.Terr
Areas NES China FTZ
Asia NES Falkland Is
Asia West NS Fr Ind O
CACM NES Fr.Guiana
Carib. NES Gibraltar
China SC Greenland
E Europe NES Guadeloupe
EEC NES New Caledonia
Eur. EFTA NS St.Helena
Eur.Other NE St.Pierre Mq
Int Org
LAIA NES
Neutral Zone
Occ.Pal.Terr
Oth.Oceania
US NES  
 
Table A-2 
Final Country Adjustments to Database
Dropped due to filters
Countries Included in Final Analysis Countries Merged Into
Initial Exports <50M or 
population < 2M
Afghanistan Germany Nigeria Germany Bahamas
Albania Ghana Norway Fm_German_FR Bahrain
Algeria Greece Pakistan Fm_German_DR Barbados
Angola Guatemala Panama Belize
Argentina Guinea Papua_N_Guin Fm_USSR Burkina_Faso
Australia Haiti Paraguay Russian_Fed Cambodia
Austria Honduras Peru Estonia China_MC_SAR
Bangladesh Hungary Philippines Latvia Cyprus
Belgium_Lux India Poland Lithuania Djibouti
Benin Indonesia Portugal Belarus Eq_Guinea
Bolivia Iran Romania Rep_Moldova Fiji
Brazil Iraq Rwanda Ukraine Gabon
Bulgaria Ireland Saudi_Arabia Kazakhstan Gambia
Burundi Israel Senegal Tajikistan GuineaBissau
Cameroon Italy Sierra_Leone Kyrgyzstan Guyana
Canada Jamaica Singapore Turkmenistan Iceland
Cent_Afr_Rep Japan South_Africa Uzbekistan Kiribati
Chad Jordan Spain Azerbaijan Kuwait
Chile Kenya Sri_Lanka Armenia Lao_P_Dem_R
China Korea_D_P_Rp Sudan Georgia Malta
China_HK_SAR Korea_Rep Sweden Mauritania
Colombia Lebanon Switz_Liecht Fm_Yugoslavia Mauritius
Congo Liberia Syria Yugoslavia Mongolia
Costa_Rica Libya Taiwan Macedonia Neth_Ant_Aru
Cote_Divoire Madagascar Tanzania Slovenia Oman
Cuba Malawi Thailand Bosnia_Herzgovina Qatar
Czechoslovak Malaysia Togo Samoa
Dem_Rp_Congo Mali Tunisia Czecholovakia Seychelles
Denmark Mexico Turkey Czech_Rep Somalia
Dominican_Rp Morocco Uganda Slovakia St_Kt_Nev_An
Ecuador Mozambique UK Suriname
Egypt Myanmar Uruguay Trinidad_Tbg
El_Salvador Nepal USA Untd_Arab_Em
Ethiopia Netherlands Venezuela
Finland New_Zealand Viet_Nam
Fm_USSR Nicaragua Zambia
Fm_Yugoslav Niger Zimbabwe
France_Monac
Countries considered in initial analysis 145
Countries finaly used after filters 112  
 
 
Table A-3
Observations and Export Value lost from database from Filtering
Export Value Lost Observations lost
year Dropped product codes
Initially dropped 
countries $100K filter Total loss
Dropped 
product codes
Initially dropped 
countries $100K filter Total loss
1984 0.9% 3.1% 0.4% 1.3% 1.4% 2.2% 18.1% 18.6%
1985 1.9% 5.1% 0.4% 2.2% 1.6% 2.1% 17.5% 18.0%
1986 1.5% 3.2% 0.3% 1.9% 1.1% 2.1% 15.9% 16.4%
1987 0.3% 2.4% 0.3% 0.5% 0.7% 2.1% 14.2% 14.4%
1988 0.3% 2.5% 0.2% 0.5% 0.7% 2.3% 12.5% 13.0%
1989 0.3% 2.6% 0.2% 0.5% 0.7% 2.2% 11.1% 11.5%
1990 0.3% 2.6% 0.1% 0.4% 0.8% 2.3% 9.5% 10.1%
1991 0.0% 2.5% 0.1% 0.1% 0.3% 2.2% 9.1% 9.2%
1992 0.1% 2.7% 0.1% 0.2% 0.9% 2.2% 8.7% 9.0%
1993 0.1% 3.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.7% 2.2% 7.7% 7.9%
1994 0.0% 3.1% 0.1% 0.2% 0.5% 2.2% 6.5% 6.6%
1995 0.1% 3.0% 0.1% 0.2% 0.6% 2.2% 5.6% 5.7%
1996 0.1% 3.3% 0.0% 0.2% 1.2% 1.8% 4.8% 5.3%
1997 0.1% 2.3% 0.0% 0.2% 1.3% 1.7% 4.7% 5.2%
1998 0.1% 2.8% 0.0% 0.2% 0.8% 1.7% 3.6% 4.0%
1999 0.1% 2.4% 0.0% 0.1% 0.6% 1.6% 2.9% 3.2%
2000 0.1% 3.5% 0.0% 0.2% 1.3% 1.7% 2.3% 2.8%  
 
 
    Table A-4 
ALTERNATIVE DECOMPOSITION
Contribution to world export growth 1984-
year colonization of original space
new 
destinations
new 
products
new dest/ 
new prod
1985 45.6% 11.9% 5.3% 2.3
1986 20.6% 1.4% 2.2% 0.6
1987 12.6% 6.9% 1.6% 4.5
1988 13.1% 5.5% 1.5% 3.7
1989 15.0% 5.5% 1.7% 3.2
1990 13.8% 4.1% 1.6% 2.6
1991 14.9% 4.8% 1.5% 3.2
1992 15.1% 5.2% 1.7% 3.0
1993 16.9% 6.2% 2.0% 3.1
1994 16.4% 5.8% 2.1% 2.8
1995 16.3% 5.4% 2.1% 2.5
1996 17.2% 5.7% 2.3% 2.5
1997 18.2% 5.7% 2.5% 2.3
1998 18.7% 5.6% 2.6% 2.1
1999 18.4% 5.8% 2.7% 2.1
2000 18.3% 6.6% 3.0% 2.2  
Table A.5 
Alternative Decomposition
1984-2000 (1) (2) - (3) (4) (5) + (7) (6) + (7)
Real Export 
Growth
net growth of 1984 
varieties (intensive)
Colonization of 
existing variety 
space
new destinations 
(extensive)
new products 
(extensive)
new dest/ 
new prod
Full Sample *
total 1 479% 347% 88% 31% 14%
contribution 
to (1) 2
- 72.4% 18.3% 6.6% 3.0%                2.2 
Filtered sample
total 1 486% 354% 87% 32% 14%
contribution 
to (1) 2
- 72.8% 18.0% 6.6% 3.0%                2.2 
Developing economies
total 1 596% 329% 164% 64% 44%
contribution 
to (1) 2 - 55.3% 27.4% 10.8% 7.4%                1.5 
Developed economies
total 1 428% 355% 55% 17% 1%
contribution 
to (1) 2 - 82.9% 12.8% 4.0% 0.3%              11.8 
Top 20 Developing
total 1 1169% 678% 310% 118% 72%
contribution 
to (1) 2
- 58.0% 26.5% 10.1% 6.2%                1.6 
Rank 21-40 Developing
total 1 437% 197% 137% 56% 51%
contribution 
to (1) 2
- 45.1% 31.5% 12.8% 11.7%                1.1 
Rank 41-60 Developing
total 1 244% 124% 78% 23% 21%
contribution 
to (1) 2 - 50.8% 32.1% 9.6% 8.8%                1.1 
Worse 20 Developing
total 1 87% 35% 32% 9% 13%
contribution 
to (1) 2
- 40.1% 36.7% 10.8% 14.4%                0.8 
* without country filters of population or minimum export value in 1984. For the rest of the calculation the filter is applied unless stated.
1 To aggregate countries I weighted the growth of each by its importance to the 1984 exports of the relevant full group being compared
2 contribution to (1) simply divides each column by column (1)
Note: The values for USA correspond to 1999, due to an error in the Feenstra Database for the 2000 values, which account for less 
          than half of the countries exported by the US in previous years  
 
  
                                                              Table A2.1                                                      
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (1) - (6) (2) + (3) + (4) + (5) (2) + (3) (4) + (5)
Rank Country Export growth
1984 surviving 
varieties growth
new dest in 1984 
variety space
new dest, 
old prod
new prod old 
dest
new dest 
new prod deaths Intensive Extensive
New 
Destinations
New 
Products
1 Viet_Nam 8249% 491% 1800% 1041% 3739% 1212% 33% 457% 7792% 2841% 4951%
2 China 2687% 1693% 681% 231% 71% 19% 7% 1686% 1002% 912% 90%
3 Thailand 1577% 591% 681% 106% 192% 24% 16% 574% 1002% 787% 216%
4 Ireland 1345% 967% 379% 1% 8% 0% 10% 957% 388% 380% 8%
5 Bangladesh 1332% 649% 461% 46% 187% 6% 18% 631% 700% 507% 193%
6 Philippines 1149% 655% 274% 43% 185% 7% 15% 641% 509% 317% 192%
7 Korea_Rep 1129% 568% 327% 193% 42% 8% 8% 559% 569% 520% 49%
8 Costa_Rica 1049% 566% 215% 19% 244% 12% 8% 558% 491% 234% 257%
9 Turkey 984% 402% 351% 135% 75% 44% 23% 379% 605% 486% 119%
10 Malaysia 945% 526% 289% 53% 80% 4% 8% 518% 426% 342% 84%
11 Israel 909% 603% 231% 45% 42% 2% 13% 590% 320% 275% 44%
12 Hungary 902% 268% 538% 29% 100% 4% 36% 231% 671% 567% 104%
13 Mexico 885% 704% 117% 27% 44% 1% 9% 696% 190% 145% 45%
14 Singapore 794% 458% 292% 48% 11% 0% 16% 442% 352% 341% 12%
15 Taiwan 783% 494% 136% 159% 3% 1% 9% 485% 298% 294% 4%
16 Honduras 751% 274% 22% 15% 455% 2% 17% 257% 494% 37% 457%
17 Chile 737% 453% 149% 69% 74% 3% 10% 443% 294% 218% 76%
18 Nepal 730% 344% 41% 32% 341% 30% 58% 286% 444% 73% 371%
19 Spain 683% 501% 184% 5% 10% 0% 17% 484% 199% 189% 10%
20 Portugal 658% 445% 198% 1% 30% 0% 16% 429% 229% 199% 30%
21 Myanmar 649% 124% 84% 59% 394% 37% 48% 76% 573% 143% 431%
22 Sri_Lanka 635% 371% 150% 20% 105% 3% 13% 358% 277% 170% 107%
23 Czechoslovak 600% 308% 258% 8% 43% 1% 17% 291% 310% 266% 44%
24 Angola 597% 263% 94% 254% 7% 1% 23% 240% 356% 348% 8%
25 Dominican_Rp 577% 450% 52% 9% 94% 1% 29% 420% 157% 61% 95%
26 Colombia 572% 335% 161% 4% 88% 0% 16% 319% 253% 165% 88%
27 Pakistan 565% 339% 159% 48% 36% 5% 21% 318% 248% 206% 41%
28 Tunisia 562% 331% 167% 12% 73% 2% 23% 308% 254% 178% 75%
29 Syria 559% 365% 60% 95% 51% 10% 22% 343% 216% 155% 61%
30 Guatemala 552% 373% 36% 16% 143% 1% 18% 355% 197% 53% 144%
31 Poland 540% 247% 259% 9% 53% 0% 28% 219% 321% 268% 54%
32 India 529% 330% 165% 22% 36% 3% 27% 303% 226% 187% 39%
33 El_Salvador 490% 102% 7% 22% 378% 5% 25% 77% 413% 30% 383%
34 Austria 482% 373% 118% 0% 4% 0% 13% 360% 122% 118% 4%
35 Finland 457% 263% 171% 30% 3% 0% 10% 253% 204% 200% 4%
36 Morocco 456% 251% 152% 16% 57% 3% 22% 229% 227% 168% 59%
37 USA 450% 391% 39% 26% 0% 0% 6% 385% 65% 65% 0%
38 Canada 437% 387% 45% 7% 7% 1% 9% 379% 59% 52% 7%
39 Italy 425% 357% 68% 7% 1% 0% 7% 349% 75% 75% 1%
40 France_Monac 425% 362% 63% 7% 0% 0% 8% 354% 71% 71% 0%
41 South_Africa 422% 179% 144% 81% 13% 17% 11% 168% 255% 225% 30%
42 Japan 416% 350% 32% 41% 0% 0% 7% 343% 74% 73% 0%
43 Germany 413% 375% 32% 10% 0% 0% 5% 370% 43% 42% 0%
44 Norway 410% 308% 107% 1% 4% 0% 9% 299% 111% 107% 4%
45 Hong Kong 399% 262% 59% 79% 4% 3% 8% 255% 144% 138% 7%
46 Sweden 398% 321% 72% 16% 2% 0% 12% 309% 90% 88% 2%
47 Argentina 397% 156% 156% 24% 90% 1% 28% 127% 270% 180% 90%
48 Indonesia 394% 131% 138% 31% 94% 6% 7% 124% 270% 169% 101%
49 UK 391% 349% 42% 6% 0% 0% 7% 342% 49% 48% 0%
50 Sudan 389% -9% 26% 2% 143% 255% 28% -37% 426% 29% 397%
51 Ghana 387% 207% 107% 33% 50% 10% 19% 188% 199% 140% 59%
52 Netherlands 376% 330% 50% 3% 0% 0% 6% 323% 53% 53% 0%
53 Belgium_Lux 374% 322% 54% 5% 0% 0% 7% 316% 59% 59% 0%
54 Fm_USSR 374% 202% 97% 87% 12% 1% 25% 177% 197% 184% 13%
55 Switz_Liecht 370% 320% 48% 8% 1% 0% 8% 313% 57% 56% 1%
56 Denmark 366% 268% 99% 6% 3% 0% 10% 258% 108% 105% 3%
57 Australia 346% 225% 97% 35% 4% 0% 15% 210% 136% 132% 4%
58 Madagascar 344% 62% 35% 30% 221% 9% 14% 48% 296% 65% 231%
59 New_Zealand 329% 230% 72% 20% 20% 0% 13% 217% 112% 92% 20%
60 Mozambique 329% 146% 41% 75% 42% 93% 68% 78% 250% 116% 134%
61 Bulgaria 310% 97% 171% 49% 38% 18% 63% 34% 276% 220% 56%
62 Zimbabwe 307% 106% 76% 90% 31% 27% 23% 83% 224% 165% 59%
63 Jamaica 301% 160% 78% 18% 53% 2% 10% 150% 151% 96% 55%
64 Nicaragua 280% 91% 24% 2% 193% 20% 50% 41% 239% 26% 213%
65 Korea_D_P_Rp 261% 19% 80% 29% 112% 65% 44% -25% 287% 109% 178%
66 Papua_N_Guin 260% 98% 12% 24% 116% 24% 14% 84% 176% 36% 140%
67 Brazil 258% 163% 99% 11% 4% 0% 19% 144% 114% 110% 5%
68 Ecuador 255% 137% 63% 13% 50% 2% 9% 128% 127% 76% 51%
69 Paraguay 248% 72% 109% 10% 105% 0% 48% 24% 224% 118% 105%
70 Venezuela 241% 169% 60% 2% 21% 1% 11% 158% 83% 62% 21%
71 Uruguay 241% 69% 94% 24% 72% 1% 19% 50% 191% 118% 73%
72 Peru 233% 104% 82% 33% 31% 1% 17% 87% 146% 114% 31%
73 Romania 226% 100% 127% 25% 22% 6% 54% 47% 180% 152% 28%
Export Decomposition Ranked by export growth
% growth 1984-2000
 
 
72 Peru 233% 104% 82% 33% 31% 1% 17% 87% 146% 114% 31%
73 Romania 226% 100% 127% 25% 22% 6% 54% 47% 180% 152% 28%
74 Nigeria 219% 152% 10% 57% 5% 1% 7% 145% 73% 67% 6%
75 Greece 214% 91% 131% 4% 17% 0% 28% 63% 151% 134% 17%
76 Benin 213% 9% 21% 141% 55% 67% 80% -71% 283% 161% 122%
77 Cent_Afr_Rep 206% 197% 12% 11% 4% 5% 23% 174% 32% 23% 10%
78 Niger 203% -27% 0% 4% 4% 226% 4% -31% 234% 4% 230%
79 Malawi 200% 96% 18% 57% 10% 31% 12% 84% 117% 75% 41%
80 Saudi_Arabia 195% 160% 29% 9% 4% 0% 7% 154% 41% 37% 4%
81 Mali 189% 57% 2% 102% 41% 19% 32% 25% 164% 104% 60%
82 Iraq 187% 169% 11% 36% 1% 0% 29% 140% 48% 47% 1%
83 Algeria 179% 115% 65% 7% 1% 0% 10% 105% 74% 72% 1%
84 Cuba 168% 30% 79% 105% 7% 8% 62% -31% 200% 184% 15%
85 Guinea 168% 88% 11% 37% 30% 6% 5% 83% 85% 49% 36%
86 Iran 165% 90% 19% 51% 10% 9% 14% 76% 88% 70% 19%
87 Congo 136% -3% 74% 51% 10% 11% 8% -10% 147% 126% 21%
88 Kenya 128% 76% 21% 4% 36% 1% 10% 66% 62% 25% 38%
89 Dem_Rp_Congo 124% 32% 11% 111% 2% 0% 32% 0% 124% 122% 2%
90 Albania 120% 12% 51% 2% 140% 4% 88% -77% 197% 53% 144%
91 Jordan 118% 23% 57% 40% 42% 12% 55% -32% 150% 97% 53%
92 Bolivia 112% -44% 90% 9% 69% 3% 16% -60% 171% 99% 72%
93 Cote_Divoire 111% 76% 27% 15% 3% 1% 12% 63% 47% 43% 4%
94 Tanzania 110% 2% 43% 9% 79% 7% 30% -28% 138% 52% 86%
95 Egypt 104% 23% 52% 9% 34% 4% 18% 5% 99% 61% 38%
96 Libya 102% 108% 9% 0% 6% 1% 21% 86% 16% 10% 6%
97 Fm_Yugoslav 94% 76% 56% 1% 3% 0% 43% 33% 60% 57% 3%
98 Ethiopia 88% 57% 19% 12% 15% 2% 16% 40% 48% 31% 17%
99 Panama 76% 30% 50% 11% 19% 1% 35% -5% 81% 61% 21%
100 Cameroon 74% 37% 19% 37% 2% 0% 22% 15% 59% 56% 2%
101 Chad 73% 12% 0% 47% 21% 12% 19% -7% 80% 47% 33%
102 Senegal 70% 43% 36% 4% 17% 1% 32% 10% 59% 41% 19%
103 Uganda 37% -23% 11% 19% 33% 3% 7% -30% 67% 31% 36%
104 Sierra_Leone 33% -23% 3% 0% 44% 71% 62% -85% 118% 3% 115%
105 Liberia 31% 72% 4% 11% 6% 1% 63% 9% 22% 16% 6%
106 Togo 22% -14% 14% 65% 11% 9% 63% -77% 99% 79% 20%
107 Afghanistan 18% 3% 33% 15% 19% 3% 54% -51% 69% 48% 21%
108 Haiti 18% 34% 2% 0% 12% 0% 30% 4% 15% 3% 12%
109 Zambia 17% -27% 14% 50% 15% 7% 42% -69% 86% 63% 22%
110 Burundi -8% -31% 5% 22% 1% 4% 10% -40% 33% 27% 6%
111 Lebanon -13% -43% 22% 4% 16% 3% 16% -59% 46% 26% 19%
112 Rwanda -15% -26% 8% 17% 2% 8% 25% -51% 35% 25% 10%
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (1) - (6) (2) + (3) + (4) + (5) (2) + (3) (4) + (5)
Rank Country Export growth
1984 surviving 
varieties growth
new dest in 1984 
variety space
new dest, 
old prod
new prod old 
dest
new dest 
new prod deaths Intensive Extensive
New 
Destinations
New 
Products
Export Decomposition Ranked by export growth
% growth 1984-2000
 
 
                                                              Table A2.1 Continued                                      
 
 
      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Columns numbered (1) to (6) in tables A2.1 and A2.2 decompose that growth in the different dimensions 
explained in the methodology section. The first column of that group shows the growth of existing varieties 
- product/destination combinations that existed in 1984 and survived in 2000 -. The second column shows 
the growth of exports of `old' products into new destinations for the product but not for the country -an 
expansion to new dots in the lower left quadrant in the framework of section 4-. The third column shows 
the importance of new destinations of existing products into completely new markets for 1984 (expansion 
into the upper left quadrant). The sum of these two is what I call new destinations. The fourth column 
shows the importance of new products in destinations where the country has already exported other 
products in the past. The fifth column shows the importance of new products not exported in 1984 into 
completely new destinations. The sum of (4) and (5) in the table is what I call new products. Finally the 
sixth column indicates how important are deaths of varieties that were exported in 1984 and were not 
exported in 2000. The intensive margin is the difference between (1) and (6). This represents the net growth 
of exporting `more of the same'. The extensive margin is the contribution to growth of (2), (3), (4) and (5). 
That is, the sum of new products and new destinations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Export Decomposition Ranked by export growth
Contribution to export growth 1984-2000
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (1) - (6) (2) + (3) + (4) + (5) (2) + (3) (4) + (5) (3) + (5)
Rank Country Export growth
1984 surviving 
varieties 
growth
new dest in 
1984 variety 
space
new dest, 
old prod
new prod 
old dest
new dest 
new prod deaths Intensive Extensive
New 
Destinations
New 
Products
New 
Destinations 2
% product 
space 
covered 84
% destination 
space 
covered 84
% variety 
space 
covered 84
1 Viet_Nam 8249% 5.9% 21.8% 12.6% 45.3% 14.7% 0.4% 5.5% 94.5% 34.4% 60.0% 27.3% 9.0% 13.8% 0.1%
2 China 2687% 63.0% 25.3% 8.6% 2.6% 0.7% 0.3% 62.7% 37.3% 33.9% 3.3% 9.3% 68.5% 34.5% 3.2%
3 Thailand 1577% 37.5% 43.2% 6.7% 12.2% 1.5% 1.0% 36.4% 63.6% 49.9% 13.7% 8.2% 43.0% 70.3% 1.6%
4 Ireland 1345% 71.9% 28.2% 0.1% 0.6% 0.0% 0.7% 71.2% 28.8% 28.3% 0.6% 0.1% 66.1% 74.5% 2.1%
5 Bangladesh 1332% 48.8% 34.6% 3.4% 14.1% 0.4% 1.4% 47.4% 52.6% 38.1% 14.5% 3.9% 7.9% 27.6% 0.2%
6 Philippines 1149% 57.0% 23.8% 3.7% 16.1% 0.6% 1.3% 55.7% 44.3% 27.6% 16.7% 4.3% 36.5% 50.3% 1.0%
7 Korea_Rep 1129% 50.3% 29.0% 17.1% 3.7% 0.7% 0.7% 49.6% 50.4% 46.1% 4.4% 17.7% 60.8% 77.9% 3.4%
8 Costa_Rica 1049% 53.9% 20.5% 1.8% 23.3% 1.2% 0.8% 53.2% 46.8% 22.3% 24.5% 3.0% 10.8% 24.8% 0.1%
9 Turkey 984% 40.8% 35.7% 13.8% 7.6% 4.5% 2.3% 38.5% 61.5% 49.4% 12.1% 18.3% 36.4% 34.5% 1.0%
10 Malaysia 945% 55.7% 30.6% 5.6% 8.5% 0.4% 0.8% 54.9% 45.1% 36.2% 8.9% 6.1% 51.8% 62.1% 1.4%
11 Israel 909% 66.3% 25.4% 4.9% 4.6% 0.3% 1.5% 64.8% 35.2% 30.3% 4.9% 5.2% 45.4% 48.3% 1.4%
12 Hungary 902% 29.7% 59.6% 3.2% 11.1% 0.4% 4.0% 25.6% 74.4% 62.9% 11.5% 3.7% 56.8% 36.6% 1.7%
13 Mexico 885% 79.5% 13.3% 3.1% 5.0% 0.1% 1.0% 78.6% 21.4% 16.3% 5.1% 3.2% 56.8% 33.1% 1.1%
14 Singapore 794% 57.6% 36.8% 6.1% 1.4% 0.0% 2.0% 55.6% 44.4% 42.9% 1.5% 6.1% 61.6% 66.2% 3.0%
15 Taiwan 783% 63.1% 17.3% 20.3% 0.4% 0.1% 1.2% 61.9% 38.1% 37.6% 0.5% 20.4% 68.4% 31.7% 4.1%
16 Honduras 751% 36.5% 2.9% 2.0% 60.6% 0.2% 2.3% 34.2% 65.8% 4.9% 60.9% 2.3% 7.5% 20.7% 0.1%
17 Chile 737% 61.5% 20.2% 9.4% 10.0% 0.3% 1.4% 60.0% 40.0% 29.6% 10.4% 9.7% 19.9% 44.1% 0.5%
18 Nepal 730% 47.1% 5.6% 4.4% 46.7% 4.1% 7.9% 39.2% 60.8% 10.0% 50.8% 8.5% 4.2% 9.7% 0.0%
19 Spain 683% 73.4% 26.9% 0.8% 1.5% 0.0% 2.5% 70.9% 29.1% 27.6% 1.5% 0.8% 77.7% 86.2% 6.1%
20 Portugal 658% 67.7% 30.0% 0.2% 4.5% 0.0% 2.5% 65.2% 34.8% 30.3% 4.5% 0.2% 48.7% 61.4% 1.8%
21 Myanmar 649% 19.1% 12.9% 9.0% 60.7% 5.7% 7.4% 11.7% 88.3% 22.0% 66.3% 14.7% 5.8% 20.7% 0.1%
22 Sri_Lanka 635% 58.3% 23.7% 3.1% 16.5% 0.4% 2.0% 56.3% 43.7% 26.8% 16.9% 3.5% 13.4% 33.1% 0.3%
23 Czechoslovak 600% 51.3% 42.9% 1.4% 7.1% 0.1% 2.9% 48.4% 51.6% 44.3% 7.3% 1.5% 60.8% 54.5% 2.1%
24 Angola 597% 44.2% 15.8% 42.6% 1.1% 0.2% 3.9% 40.3% 59.7% 58.4% 1.3% 42.7% 1.5% 9.7% 0.0%
25 Dominican_Rp 577% 78.0% 9.1% 1.5% 16.3% 0.2% 5.1% 72.9% 27.1% 10.6% 16.5% 1.7% 13.0% 15.2% 0.1%
26 Colombia 572% 58.5% 28.1% 0.8% 15.3% 0.0% 2.8% 55.7% 44.3% 28.9% 15.4% 0.8% 25.6% 46.9% 0.5%
27 Pakistan 565% 60.0% 28.0% 8.5% 6.4% 0.9% 3.8% 56.2% 43.8% 36.5% 7.3% 9.4% 24.2% 57.9% 0.7%
28 Tunisia 562% 59.0% 29.7% 2.1% 13.0% 0.4% 4.2% 54.8% 45.2% 31.8% 13.4% 2.5% 18.6% 37.2% 0.3%
29 Syria 559% 65.3% 10.7% 17.1% 9.1% 1.8% 3.9% 61.4% 38.6% 27.8% 10.9% 18.9% 8.8% 21.4% 0.1%
30 Guatemala 552% 67.6% 6.6% 3.0% 26.0% 0.2% 3.3% 64.3% 35.7% 9.5% 26.1% 3.1% 8.6% 25.5% 0.1%
31 Poland 540% 45.6% 47.9% 1.6% 9.9% 0.1% 5.1% 40.5% 59.5% 49.6% 9.9% 1.7% 58.7% 53.1% 1.8%
32 India 529% 62.3% 31.1% 4.2% 6.8% 0.5% 5.0% 57.3% 42.7% 35.4% 7.3% 4.7% 55.0% 67.6% 2.3%
33 El_Salvador 490% 20.8% 1.5% 4.5% 77.2% 1.0% 5.0% 15.7% 84.3% 6.1% 78.2% 5.5% 5.6% 19.3% 0.1%
34 Austria 482% 77.3% 24.5% 0.0% 0.8% 0.0% 2.6% 74.7% 25.3% 24.5% 0.8% 0.0% 76.2% 84.8% 5.2%
35 Finland 457% 57.7% 37.4% 6.5% 0.8% 0.0% 2.3% 55.4% 44.6% 43.8% 0.8% 6.5% 58.4% 69.0% 2.9%
36 Morocco 456% 55.0% 33.3% 3.4% 12.4% 0.6% 4.8% 50.2% 49.8% 36.8% 13.0% 4.0% 20.9% 49.7% 0.5%
37 USA 450% 87.0% 8.7% 5.7% 0.1% 0.0% 1.4% 85.6% 14.4% 14.4% 0.1% 5.7% 90.0% 90.3% 16.7%
38 Canada 437% 88.6% 10.3% 1.5% 1.5% 0.1% 2.0% 86.6% 13.4% 11.8% 1.6% 1.6% 79.1% 84.8% 4.1%
39 Italy 425% 84.0% 15.9% 1.7% 0.1% 0.0% 1.7% 82.2% 17.8% 17.6% 0.1% 1.7% 84.4% 95.9% 12.7%
40 France_Monac 425% 85.3% 14.9% 1.7% 0.0% 0.0% 1.9% 83.3% 16.7% 16.6% 0.0% 1.7% 89.5% 96.6% 14.9%
41 South_Africa 422% 42.3% 34.1% 19.1% 3.1% 3.9% 2.5% 39.8% 60.2% 53.2% 7.0% 23.1% 44.2% 32.4% 1.3%
42 Japan 416% 84.0% 7.7% 9.9% 0.1% 0.0% 1.7% 82.3% 17.7% 17.6% 0.1% 9.9% 81.3% 97.9% 13.0%
43 Germany 413% 90.8% 7.8% 2.5% 0.1% 0.0% 1.2% 89.7% 10.3% 10.3% 0.1% 2.5% 90.8% 95.9% 19.0%
44 Norway 410% 75.1% 26.0% 0.1% 0.9% 0.0% 2.2% 72.9% 27.1% 26.2% 0.9% 0.1% 54.0% 76.6% 2.5%
45 Hong Kong 399% 65.7% 14.7% 19.9% 1.0% 0.7% 1.9% 63.8% 36.2% 34.5% 1.6% 20.5% 54.2% 75.9% 3.1%
46 Sweden 398% 80.5% 18.1% 3.9% 0.5% 0.0% 3.0% 77.5% 22.5% 22.0% 0.5% 3.9% 74.9% 83.4% 6.5%
47 Argentina 397% 39.2% 39.3% 6.0% 22.6% 0.1% 7.1% 32.1% 67.9% 45.2% 22.7% 6.1% 42.5% 68.3% 1.3%
48 Indonesia 394% 33.2% 35.2% 7.8% 24.0% 1.6% 1.8% 31.4% 68.6% 43.0% 25.6% 9.5% 30.4% 49.0% 0.9%
49 UK 391% 89.2% 10.7% 1.6% 0.1% 0.0% 1.7% 87.5% 12.5% 12.4% 0.1% 1.6% 87.9% 97.2% 15.5%
50 Sudan 389% -2.2% 6.7% 0.6% 36.7% 65.5% 7.3% -9.5% 109.5% 7.3% 102.2% 66.1% 5.8% 25.5% 0.1%
51 Ghana 387% 53.4% 27.6% 8.6% 12.8% 2.5% 4.9% 48.5% 51.5% 36.2% 15.3% 11.1% 3.1% 19.3% 0.1%
52 Netherlands 376% 87.6% 13.2% 0.8% 0.1% 0.0% 1.7% 85.9% 14.1% 14.0% 0.1% 0.8% 85.6% 95.9% 9.6%
53 Belgium_Lux 374% 86.1% 14.4% 1.3% 0.1% 0.0% 1.8% 84.3% 15.7% 15.6% 0.1% 1.3% 84.5% 94.5% 8.0%
54 Fm_USSR 374% 54.0% 25.8% 23.4% 3.2% 0.3% 6.7% 47.3% 52.7% 49.2% 3.6% 23.7% 56.2% 33.1% 1.6%
55 Switz_Liecht 370% 86.7% 13.1% 2.1% 0.2% 0.0% 2.1% 84.6% 15.4% 15.2% 0.2% 2.1% 76.9% 88.3% 7.0%
56 Denmark 366% 73.2% 27.1% 1.7% 0.8% 0.0% 2.8% 70.4% 29.6% 28.8% 0.8% 1.7% 69.2% 87.6% 4.6%
57 Australia 346% 65.1% 28.0% 10.1% 1.1% 0.1% 4.3% 60.8% 39.2% 38.1% 1.1% 10.2% 65.9% 72.4% 2.6%
58 Madagascar 344% 18.0% 10.1% 8.8% 64.3% 2.8% 4.0% 14.0% 86.0% 18.9% 67.1% 11.6% 3.2% 15.9% 0.1%
 
Table A2.2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A2.2 Continued 
Export Decomposition Ranked by export growth
Contribution to export growth 1984-2000
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (1) - (6) (2) + (3) + (4) + (5) (2) + (3) (4) + (5) (3) + (5)
Rank Country Export growth
1984 surviving 
varieties 
growth
new dest in 
1984 variety 
space
new dest, 
old prod
new prod 
old dest
new dest 
new prod deaths Intensive Extensive
New 
Destinations
New 
Products
New 
Destinations 2
% product 
space 
covered 84
% destination 
space 
covered 84
% variety 
space 
covered 84  
59 New_Zealand 329% 69.8% 21.8% 6.1% 6.0% 0.1% 3.9% 65.9% 34.1% 27.9% 6.2% 6.3% 43.8% 64.8% 1.2%
60 Mozambique 329% 44.4% 12.6% 22.7% 12.6% 28.3% 20.6% 23.8% 76.2% 35.3% 40.9% 51.0% 5.2% 15.2% 0.1%
61 Bulgaria 310% 31.4% 55.1% 15.8% 12.3% 5.7% 20.3% 11.1% 88.9% 70.9% 18.0% 21.4% 40.2% 31.0% 0.7%
62 Zimbabwe 307% 34.5% 24.6% 29.2% 10.2% 8.8% 7.4% 27.1% 72.9% 53.8% 19.1% 38.0% 7.0% 22.8% 0.1%
63 Jamaica 301% 53.1% 25.8% 6.1% 17.8% 0.5% 3.3% 49.8% 50.2% 31.9% 18.3% 6.7% 8.3% 14.5% 0.1%
64 Nicaragua 280% 32.6% 8.5% 0.8% 68.8% 7.2% 17.8% 14.7% 85.3% 9.2% 76.0% 8.0% 2.6% 17.2% 0.1%
65 Korea_D_P_Rp 261% 7.3% 30.7% 11.0% 42.9% 25.0% 16.9% -9.7% 109.7% 41.7% 67.9% 36.0% 12.7% 15.2% 0.1%
66 Papua_N_Guin 260% 37.5% 4.7% 9.3% 44.6% 9.2% 5.3% 32.2% 67.8% 14.0% 53.8% 18.5% 4.5% 18.6% 0.1%
67 Brazil 258% 63.1% 38.3% 4.2% 1.7% 0.1% 7.5% 55.6% 44.4% 42.5% 1.9% 4.3% 71.3% 81.4% 4.0%
68 Ecuador 255% 53.7% 24.5% 5.2% 19.4% 0.7% 3.6% 50.2% 49.8% 29.7% 20.1% 5.9% 9.4% 31.7% 0.2%
69 Paraguay 248% 29.2% 43.8% 4.0% 42.3% 0.1% 19.4% 9.8% 90.2% 47.7% 42.5% 4.1% 6.5% 24.1% 0.1%
70 Venezuela 241% 69.9% 24.8% 0.8% 8.6% 0.3% 4.5% 65.5% 34.5% 25.7% 8.9% 1.2% 17.5% 41.4% 0.3%
71 Uruguay 241% 28.8% 39.0% 9.8% 30.1% 0.3% 7.9% 20.9% 79.1% 48.8% 30.4% 10.1% 21.6% 29.0% 0.4%
72 Peru 233% 44.6% 35.1% 14.0% 13.1% 0.4% 7.2% 37.4% 62.6% 49.1% 13.5% 14.4% 23.0% 46.2% 0.5%
73 Romania 226% 44.3% 56.0% 11.2% 9.6% 2.5% 23.7% 20.7% 79.3% 67.2% 12.2% 13.7% 44.3% 33.8% 1.2%
74 Nigeria 219% 69.5% 4.6% 26.2% 2.4% 0.3% 3.0% 66.5% 33.5% 30.8% 2.7% 26.5% 6.9% 19.3% 0.1%
75 Greece 214% 42.5% 61.2% 1.7% 7.7% 0.1% 13.2% 29.3% 70.7% 62.9% 7.8% 1.8% 44.3% 57.2% 1.4%
76 Benin 213% 4.4% 9.6% 66.0% 25.8% 31.7% 37.5% -33.1% 133.1% 75.6% 57.5% 97.7% 1.9% 10.3% 0.0%
77 Cent_Afr_Rep 206% 95.5% 5.6% 5.3% 2.1% 2.6% 11.1% 84.4% 15.6% 10.9% 4.7% 7.9% 2.2% 11.0% 0.0%
78 Niger 203% -13.2% 0.0% 2.0% 2.0% 111.3% 2.1% -15.3% 115.3% 2.0% 113.4% 113.3% 1.3% 4.8% 0.0%
79 Malawi 200% 47.9% 9.0% 28.6% 5.1% 15.5% 6.1% 41.8% 58.2% 37.6% 20.6% 44.1% 1.4% 15.9% 0.0%
80 Saudi_Arabia 195% 82.2% 14.7% 4.5% 1.9% 0.2% 3.4% 78.8% 21.2% 19.2% 2.0% 4.6% 19.9% 30.3% 0.3%
81 Mali 189% 30.1% 1.0% 54.1% 21.4% 10.3% 16.8% 13.3% 86.7% 55.0% 31.7% 64.3% 1.8% 13.1% 0.0%
82 Iraq 187% 90.0% 5.9% 19.0% 0.4% 0.2% 15.5% 74.5% 25.5% 24.9% 0.6% 19.2% 7.0% 24.1% 0.1%
83 Algeria 179% 64.6% 36.5% 4.0% 0.6% 0.2% 5.8% 58.8% 41.2% 40.5% 0.7% 4.2% 8.3% 39.3% 0.2%
84 Cuba 168% 18.0% 47.1% 62.5% 4.4% 4.6% 36.6% -18.6% 118.6% 109.6% 9.0% 67.1% 9.8% 22.8% 0.2%
85 Guinea 168% 52.2% 6.8% 22.3% 17.7% 3.8% 2.8% 49.4% 50.6% 29.1% 21.5% 26.2% 1.9% 13.1% 0.0%
86 Iran 165% 54.8% 11.6% 30.8% 5.8% 5.4% 8.5% 46.3% 53.7% 42.4% 11.3% 36.2% 8.5% 26.9% 0.2%
87 Congo 136% -1.9% 54.6% 37.5% 7.5% 8.1% 5.8% -7.7% 107.7% 92.1% 15.6% 45.5% 2.5% 15.2% 0.1%
88 Kenya 128% 59.1% 16.2% 3.0% 28.2% 1.1% 7.6% 51.5% 48.5% 19.1% 29.4% 4.1% 8.3% 28.3% 0.2%
89 Dem_Rp_Congo 124% 25.8% 9.0% 89.6% 1.3% 0.1% 25.8% 0.0% 100.0% 98.6% 1.4% 89.8% 5.2% 18.6% 0.1%
90 Albania 120% 9.7% 42.5% 1.3% 116.6% 3.6% 73.6% -63.9% 163.9% 43.8% 120.1% 4.9% 9.0% 13.8% 0.1%
91 Jordan 118% 19.5% 48.1% 34.1% 35.3% 9.9% 46.9% -27.4% 127.4% 82.2% 45.2% 44.0% 10.5% 21.4% 0.1%
92 Bolivia 112% -39.0% 80.5% 8.1% 62.1% 2.6% 14.3% -53.3% 153.3% 88.6% 64.7% 10.7% 5.3% 18.6% 0.1%
93 Cote_Divoire 111% 68.4% 24.7% 13.9% 3.0% 1.0% 11.1% 57.3% 42.7% 38.6% 4.0% 15.0% 8.9% 26.2% 0.2%
94 Tanzania 110% 1.7% 39.0% 8.3% 71.6% 6.8% 27.4% -25.7% 125.7% 47.3% 78.4% 15.1% 5.0% 22.1% 0.1%
95 Egypt 104% 22.1% 50.2% 8.3% 32.4% 4.2% 17.2% 4.9% 95.1% 58.5% 36.6% 12.5% 14.7% 29.0% 0.3%
96 Libya 102% 105.2% 9.3% 0.3% 5.6% 0.6% 21.0% 84.2% 15.8% 9.6% 6.2% 0.9% 4.1% 25.5% 0.1%
97 Fm_Yugoslav 94% 81.3% 59.5% 1.5% 3.7% 0.0% 45.9% 35.4% 64.6% 60.9% 3.7% 1.5% 71.4% 65.5% 2.7%
98 Ethiopia 88% 64.2% 21.8% 13.2% 16.5% 2.7% 18.4% 45.8% 54.2% 35.0% 19.2% 15.9% 4.7% 17.9% 0.1%
99 Panama 76% 38.7% 65.1% 14.2% 25.5% 1.9% 45.4% -6.7% 106.7% 79.3% 27.4% 16.1% 21.9% 25.5% 0.3%
100 Cameroon 74% 50.1% 25.9% 50.2% 2.7% 0.5% 29.3% 20.7% 79.3% 76.1% 3.2% 50.7% 5.6% 17.9% 0.1%
101 Chad 73% 16.5% 0.0% 64.3% 29.0% 16.2% 25.9% -9.4% 109.4% 64.3% 45.2% 80.5% 0.4% 8.3% 0.0%
102 Senegal 70% 61.2% 52.2% 6.4% 24.9% 1.7% 46.3% 14.8% 85.2% 58.6% 26.6% 8.0% 4.8% 15.2% 0.1%
103 Uganda 37% -63.6% 31.5% 52.8% 90.6% 7.7% 19.0% -82.6% 182.6% 84.3% 98.2% 60.5% 1.5% 15.2% 0.0%
104 Sierra_Leone 33% -71.3% 7.7% 1.4% 134.0% 218.9% 190.8% -262.1% 362.1% 9.2% 352.9% 220.4% 2.1% 9.0% 0.0%
105 Liberia 31% 231.4% 13.3% 36.5% 18.6% 2.2% 202.0% 29.4% 70.6% 49.8% 20.8% 38.7% 3.9% 16.6% 0.1%
106 Togo 22% -66.7% 63.5% 300.7% 51.4% 40.4% 289.2% -355.9% 455.9% 364.2% 91.8% 341.0% 2.3% 16.6% 0.0%
107 Afghanistan 18% 15.5% 180.3% 81.0% 100.2% 14.1% 291.0% -275.5% 375.5% 261.2% 114.3% 95.0% 4.5% 16.6% 0.1%
108 Haiti 18% 187.4% 13.7% 0.6% 65.2% 0.4% 167.2% 20.1% 79.9% 14.3% 65.6% 1.0% 10.7% 10.3% 0.1%
109 Zambia 17% -161.5% 81.0% 295.9% 88.3% 44.2% 247.9% -409.4% 509.4% 376.9% 132.5% 340.1% 3.3% 18.6% 0.1%
110 Burundi -8% 391.6% -62.2% -278.7% -18.6% -56.0% -123.8% 515.4% -415.4% -340.9% -74.5% -334.7% 1.5% 10.3% 0.0%
111 Lebanon -13% 332.0% -173.1% -31.3% -123.7% -26.6% -122.7% 454.7% -354.7% -204.5% -150.3% -57.9% 14.3% 21.4% 0.2%
112 Rwanda -15% 166.6% -51.4% -110.3% -13.6% -54.5% -163.3% 329.9% -229.9% -161.8% -68.1% -164.8% 1.1% 9.0% 0.0%  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A.2.3 
Expansion of colonization of varieties in original space
Rank Country own space covered 84
% of original 
1984 space 
used in 2000
growth of use of 
original space 
(in varieties)
% variety space 
covered 84
% variety 
space 
covered 00
48 Indonesia 5.8% 24.5% 321.4% 0.9% 8.9%
10 Malaysia 4.5% 17.2% 286.4% 1.4% 8.4%
3 Thailand 5.1% 19.4% 280.8% 1.6% 10.4%
2 China 13.4% 46.8% 248.1% 3.2% 22.7%
9 Turkey 7.7% 26.0% 237.3% 1.0% 7.7%
13 Mexico 5.7% 19.2% 233.9% 1.1% 6.9%
1 Viet_Nam 9.6% 30.5% 216.5% 0.1% 2.6%
26 Colombia 3.9% 11.4% 195.9% 0.5% 2.6%
7 Korea_Rep 7.1% 20.5% 188.6% 3.4% 14.2%
32 India 6.1% 16.3% 165.0% 2.3% 8.7%
17 Chile 5.6% 14.5% 157.4% 0.5% 2.8%
31 Poland 5.7% 14.5% 155.1% 1.8% 6.5%
23 Czechoslovak 6.3% 15.8% 152.9% 2.1% 7.4%
11 Israel 6.4% 15.8% 147.9% 1.4% 5.4%
19 Spain 9.1% 22.1% 143.5% 6.1% 18.3%
70 Venezuela 4.3% 10.2% 135.9% 0.3% 1.7%
57 Australia 5.5% 12.9% 135.9% 2.6% 8.2%
14 Singapore 7.3% 17.2% 135.0% 3.0% 9.6%
4 Ireland 4.2% 9.8% 134.0% 2.1% 6.0%
20 Portugal 5.9% 13.7% 132.5% 1.8% 5.7%
41 South_Africa 8.7% 19.7% 127.4% 1.3% 8.1%
8 Costa_Rica 4.9% 11.0% 125.0% 0.1% 0.7%
6 Philippines 5.3% 11.8% 124.0% 1.0% 3.8%
75 Greece 5.4% 12.2% 123.6% 1.4% 4.7%
54 Fm_USSR 8.8% 19.3% 120.7% 1.6% 7.1%
22 Sri_Lanka 7.2% 15.8% 119.5% 0.3% 1.3%
12 Hungary 8.0% 17.3% 116.7% 1.7% 5.6%
5 Bangladesh 8.0% 17.0% 113.0% 0.2% 0.8%
68 Ecuador 5.5% 11.6% 111.7% 0.2% 1.0%
38 Canada 6.0% 12.7% 110.7% 4.1% 10.6%
47 Argentina 4.5% 9.4% 107.3% 1.3% 4.3%
27 Pakistan 4.8% 9.8% 105.1% 0.7% 2.2%
28 Tunisia 4.7% 9.4% 98.6% 0.3% 1.4%
35 Finland 7.3% 14.3% 97.6% 2.9% 7.4%
36 Morocco 4.6% 9.0% 94.6% 0.5% 1.7%
80 Saudi_Arabia 5.5% 10.6% 93.6% 0.3% 1.4%
15 Taiwan 18.6% 35.9% 92.8% 4.1% 11.4%
59 New_Zealand 4.2% 8.0% 90.1% 1.2% 3.2%
56 Denmark 7.5% 14.1% 88.7% 4.6% 10.6%
53 Belgium_Lux 10.0% 18.7% 87.1% 8.0% 18.1%
95 Egypt 6.9% 12.8% 86.0% 0.3% 1.5%
67 Brazil 6.8% 12.4% 81.7% 4.0% 9.1%
45 Hong Kong 7.5% 13.6% 80.9% 3.1% 7.7%
44 Norway 6.1% 10.9% 78.1% 2.5% 5.7%
34 Austria 8.0% 14.1% 76.8% 5.2% 11.1%
52 Netherlands 11 6% 20 3% 74 9% 9 6% 20 2%  
 
Table A.2.3 Continued 
Expansion of colonization of varieties in original space
Rank Country own space covered 84
% of original 
1984 space 
used in 2000
growth of use of 
original space 
(in varieties)
% variety space 
covered 84
% variety 
space 
covered 00  
52 Netherlands 11.6% 20.3% 74.9% 9.6% 20.2%
39 Italy 15.6% 26.7% 70.9% 12.7% 26.2%
86 Iran 8.1% 13.7% 69.4% 0.2% 1.6%
72 Peru 4.7% 7.8% 68.0% 0.5% 1.6%
61 Bulgaria 5.8% 9.7% 67.8% 0.7% 2.5%
51 Ghana 12.0% 20.0% 67.0% 0.1% 0.3%
29 Syria 5.8% 9.4% 61.4% 0.1% 0.5%
73 Romania 7.8% 12.3% 57.1% 1.2% 3.1%
55 Switz_Liecht 10.2% 15.9% 55.6% 7.0% 13.2%
46 Sweden 10.3% 16.0% 55.1% 6.5% 12.3%
40 France_Monac 17.1% 26.3% 53.6% 14.9% 27.5%
25 Dominican_Rp 6.9% 10.1% 45.6% 0.1% 0.4%
49 UK 18.0% 25.4% 41.0% 15.5% 26.2%
30 Guatemala 6.2% 8.7% 40.2% 0.1% 0.5%
71 Uruguay 5.6% 7.9% 40.1% 0.4% 0.9%
43 Germany 21.7% 28.5% 31.4% 19.0% 30.0%
62 Zimbabwe 8.6% 10.7% 24.9% 0.1% 0.5%
97 Fm_Yugoslav 5.8% 7.0% 21.7% 2.7% 4.1%
42 Japan 16.2% 19.0% 17.3% 13.0% 18.5%
58 Madagascar 13.9% 16.3% 17.2% 0.1% 0.3%
99 Panama 5.4% 6.2% 15.7% 0.3% 0.7%
63 Jamaica 8.0% 9.1% 14.3% 0.1% 0.2%
92 Bolivia 7.9% 8.8% 10.7% 0.1% 0.3%
21 Myanmar 9.6% 10.4% 9.2% 0.1% 0.5%
111 Lebanon 5.2% 5.5% 5.7% 0.2% 0.4%
16 Honduras 7.4% 7.7% 4.0% 0.1% 0.3%
79 Malawi 20.1% 20.7% 3.3% 0.0% 0.1%
37 USA 20.4% 20.9% 2.5% 16.7% 33.1%
94 Tanzania 9.6% 9.8% 2.2% 0.1% 0.3%
100 Cameroon 12.3% 12.4% 1.2% 0.1% 0.2%
93 Cote_Divoire 10.3% 10.3% 0.0% 0.2% 0.4%
103 Uganda 14.3% 14.3% 0.0% 0.0% 0.1%
91 Jordan 5.6% 5.6% -0.6% 0.1% 0.4%
65 Korea_D_P_Rp 6.3% 6.0% -3.8% 0.1% 0.6%
102 Senegal 12.3% 11.7% -5.0% 0.1% 0.2%
85 Guinea 10.8% 10.2% -5.7% 0.0% 0.1%
88 Kenya 8.2% 7.7% -6.0% 0.2% 0.4%
87 Congo 14.2% 13.0% -8.3% 0.1% 0.1%
64 Nicaragua 11.2% 10.0% -10.4% 0.1% 0.2%
18 Nepal 9.4% 8.3% -12.0% 0.0% 0.2%
74 Nigeria 9.6% 8.0% -16.0% 0.1% 0.3%
83 Algeria 6.0% 4.8% -19.6% 0.2% 0.3%
66 Papua_N_Guin 10.5% 8.4% -19.8% 0.1% 0.2%
69 Paraguay 8.3% 6.6% -20.3% 0.1% 0.3%
33 El_Salvador 6.4% 5.0% -21.7% 0.1% 0.2%
96 Libya 8.5% 6.2% -26.7% 0.1% 0.2%
98 Ethiopia 9.8% 7.2% -27.3% 0.1% 0.1%
81 Mali 13.2% 9.5% -27.5% 0.0% 0.1%
77 Cent_Afr_Rep 12.2% 8.8% -28.2% 0.0% 0.0%
50 Sudan 7.6% 5.4% -29.5% 0.1% 0.2%
24 Angola 17.9% 12.2% -31.4% 0.0% 0.1%
84 Cuba 6.9% 4.5% -34.7% 0.2% 0.2%
106 Togo 12.7% 7.9% -37.5% 0.0% 0.1%
108 Haiti 9.3% 5.4% -42.2% 0.1% 0.1%
110 Burundi 12.9% 7.1% -44.4% 0.0% 0.0%
109 Zambia 10.1% 5.4% -46.3% 0.1% 0.1%
101 Chad 29.2% 14.6% -50.0% 0.0% 0.0%
90 Albania 8.7% 4.1% -52.8% 0.1% 0.2%
60 Mozambique 7.8% 3.5% -55.6% 0.1% 0.1%
107 Afghanistan 9.9% 4.1% -58.8% 0.1% 0.1%
105 Liberia 11.1% 4.5% -59.1% 0.1% 0.1%
112 Rwanda 23.8% 9.2% -61.3% 0.0% 0.0%
76 Benin 15.7% 5.9% -62.5% 0.0% 0.1%
89 Dem_Rp_Congo 12.8% 4.6% -64.2% 0.1% 0.1%
104 Sierra_Leone 15.4% 4.0% -73.7% 0.0% 0.1%
82 Iraq 6.3% 1.2% -81.7% 0.1% 0.1%
78 Niger 14.3% 2.4% -83.3% 0.0% 0.0%
Note: Sorted by growth of use of original space (in varieties)  
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Table A.2.4 
year 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
84 structure 37.9% 76.0% 79.2% 80.1% 78.0% 80.8% 79.0% 78.3% 75.1% 76.2% 76.4% 75.0% 73.8% 73.4% 73.4% 72.4%
new destinations 56.8% 21.9% 19.2% 18.4% 20.3% 17.6% 19.5% 20.0% 22.9% 22.0% 21.5% 22.7% 23.7% 24.0% 23.9% 24.6%
new products 5.3% 2.2% 1.6% 1.5% 1.7% 1.6% 1.5% 1.7% 2.0% 2.1% 2.1% 2.3% 2.5% 2.6% 2.7% 3.0%
Total Exp Growth 6% 19% 47% 74% 98% 138% 159% 186% 187% 235% 311% 347% 375% 377% 409% 479%
Avg Year Growth 6% 9% 14% 15% 15% 16% 15% 14% 12% 13% 14% 13% 13% 12% 11% 12%  
 
Note: calculation using 113 countries after filters.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
